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Obergefell v. Hodges Clears a Path to
Protecting Gay and Lesbian Employees from
Workplace Discrimination Under Title VII
Matthew W. Green Jr.*
The plaintiffs also state that, by treating their marriagesas if
they did not exist, the state . . encourages private citizens to
deny their marriages and exposes them to discrimination in
their daily lives.'
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INTRODUCTION

Valeria Tanco and Sophie Jesty sued the state of Tennessee for failing to
recognize their marriage lawfully performed and recognized in another state. 2
Tennessee's nonrecognition rendered the couple ineligible for state government
benefits available to opposite-sex married couples. 3 As the quote above explains,
however, the harm that flowed from Tennessee's actions extended beyond
denial of state benefits. By refusing to recognize their marriage, Tennessee also
encouraged non-governmental entities and other individuals to discriminate
against them as well. 4 In other words, the government's actions had a greater
effect on its gay citizens than denying them government benefits, because their
spouses were of the same sex. It encouraged private discrimination against these
couples as well.
Civil rights activist Frank Kameny described a similar connection between
public and private-sector discrimination when explaining the effects of the
federal government's once blanket policy that declared homosexuality and
government employment to be incompatible. ' According to Kameny, the
policies reached far beyond the denial of federal government employment to
gays.6 They set the tone for employment policies and practices throughout all of
American business.' After all, "if the federal government could exclude gays,
and did, then private employers not only could but should. And they did."'

2

Tonco, 7 F.

Supp. 3d at 763-64.

See id. at 764.
See id. at 770 (explaining that the state's refusal to recognize the marriage, "invites public and
private discrimination and stigmatization").
s Franklin E. Kameny, Government v. Gays: Two Sad Stories with Two Happy Endings. Civil
Service Employment and Security Clearances,in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 214 (John D'Emilio, William B. Turner et al. eds., 2000).
6 See id. at 214-15.

' See id.
'Id. at 215.
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In Obergefell v. Hodges9 gay and lesbian couples, like Valeria and Sophie,
prevailed in the battle for marriage equality. The Obergefell Court struck down
10
anti-gay marriage bans and mandated marriage equality in all fifty states. But
how far, if at all, does the substantive reach of Obergefell extend beyond
marriage? Commentators have offered varying perspectives. " Kyle Velte
argues, for instance, that the true value of Obergefell is its expressive promise.
According to Professor Velte, Obergefell's true import is its transformative
potential grounded in the message the opinion sends to society about how
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") people should be respected
and valued. 12 That expressive message can be harnessed to influence the
political arena resulting in wide-reaching legal protections for LGBT
individuals.1 3 Obergefell's promise is not its "legal holding," but its normative
statement. 14
While Obergefell does not directly address gay civil rights in employment
discrimination-the subject matter of this article-it is too soon to dismiss its
substantive reach in that area or others. Currently, no federal statute protects
LGBT persons from employment discrimination. With explicit protection
lacking, gay individuals have attempted to fill the gap by relying on the
proscription against sex discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII").'I This article argues that Obergefell may advance the
rights of gay men and lesbians in the employment context. 16 Its explicit
identification of same-sex sexual intimacy as a fundamental right and

9 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
"o See id. at 2598-99 (holding that marriage is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment and is available to both same and opposite-sex couples).
" See e.g., Donald HJ. Hermann, Extending the Fundamental Right of Marriage to Same-Sex
Couples: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 49 IND. L. REV. 367,

367 (2016) (explaining that Obergefell provides no direct legal authority to claims for protection
from discrimination in employment or access to other forms of accommodation); Tobias Barrington

Wolff, The Three Voices of Obergefell, 38 L.A. LAW. 28, 28 (2015) ("It is too soon to know how
much has changed following" Obergefell, "but it is apparent that it is a new day."); Kyle Velte,
Obergefell's Expressive Promise, 6 Hous. L. REV. 157, 157-58 (2015) http://www.houstonlaw
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11I/1relte-final.pdf (noting the narrowness of Obergefell);

Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 147
(2014) [hereinafter A New Birth of Freedom?] ("While Obergefell's most immediate effect was to
legalize same-sex marriage across the land, its long-term impact could extend far beyond this
context.").
12 See Velte, supra note 11, at 158.
" See id.
14 Id.

" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see also discussion infra Part Il.A. 1-2.
While the focus of this article is on Obergefell's potential to affect the rights of gay and lesbian
individuals in employment, the decision may well have a positive effect on the rights of transgender
16

individuals as well.
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recognition that sexual orientation is both immutable and a "normal expression
of human sexuality" has the potential to protect workers from sexual orientation
discrimination by significantly influencing the interpretation of Title VII.' 7
While authority on the issue is split, an increasing number of courts have
held that discrimination against an individual because of sexual orientation
constitutes impermissible sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 18 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") recently adopted this
position as well. 19 It is the better reading of the statue. According to the
American Psychological Association ("APA") and other leading medical and
mental health organizations, "[s]exual acts or attractions are categorized as
homosexual or heterosexual according to the biological sex of the individuals
involved, relative to each other." 20 Further, individuals express their sexuality by
acting (or desiring to act) sexually with individuals of a particular sex. 2' That
definition means that sexual orientation and biological sex are inextricably
linked, because it is impossible to conceptualize sexual orientation without also
taking into account a person's sex and the sex of individuals with whom she is
or desires to be sexually intimate. Thus, discrimination on the basis of an
individual's sexual orientation necessarily implicates considerations of his or her
sex as well.22 While that analysis is straightforward, the issue of whether Title
VII outlaws sexual orientation discrimination is unsettled. Despite
overwhelming support for that position among commentators,23 the issue divides
the federal courts and to date no federal appellate court has adopted it.24

" See infra Part V.
5

See infra Part Ill.B.2.

'9 See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 16, 2015); see
also infra Part III.B.2.
20 See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 10, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14574), 2015 WL 1004713. Other Amici signing onto this brief include the American Psychiatric
Association, the National Association of Social Workers, the American Psychoanalytic Association,
and the American Medical Association.
21 See id. ("[I1t is only by acting with another person-or desiring to act-that individuals express
their heterosexuality [or] homosexuality . . . . [S]exual orientation is integrally linked to the intimate
personal relationships that human beings form with others to meet their deeply felt needs for love,
attachment, and intimacy.") Moreover, sexual orientation "defines the universe of persons with
whom one is likely to find the satisfying and fulfilling relationships that, for many individuals,
comprise an essential component of personal identity." Id.
See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at *5 ("'Sexual orientation' as a concept cannot be defined or
understood without reference to sex.").
23 See e.g., Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough
for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L.
REv. 715, 726 (2014); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protectionsfor the PersonalBest of Each Employee:
Title VII's Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1337 (2014) [hereinafter Legal Protections];Joel Wim.
Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14
22
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Obergefell strengthens the argument that sexual orientation discrimination
violates Title VII. The Court's rationale allows the opportunity for employees to
rely on authority holding that Title VII forbids employers from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of sex when doing so implicates a fundamental
right or a characteristic that is immutable.25 Such discrimination might occur, for
example, if an employer refuses to hire married women but not married men.
The employer in this instance is not discriminating against all women, but only a
subset of them-those that exercise their fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution to marry. The same should be true if an employer discriminates
against a subset of men or women who exercise their constitutional right to
engage in consensual, adult sexual intimacy with the same or opposite sex or are
perceived as doing so. Obergefell explicitly characterized that right as
fundamental. 26 It also recognized that leading medical and mental health
professional organizations consider sexual orientation to be immutable. 27 Thus,
an employer violates Title VII if it treats its male employees who, because of
their sexual orientation or otherwise, exercise their fundamental right to be
intimate with other men differently than it treats its female employees who also
exercise their fundamental right to be intimate with men. The employer has
discriminated against a subset of men (or women) because of their sex as well as
an immutable trait and their respective decisions to exercise a fundamental
28
right.
Numerous courts have recognized this "sex plus" discrimination under Title
VII. Courts adopting this theory have often held that no Title VII protection is
warranted if the "plus" factor involves rights that are not constitutionally
29
significant or traits that are easily changeable or mutable. These cases often
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 205, 205 (2007); 1. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and

Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1169 (1991).
24 See Soucek, supra note 23, at 722 (explaining how the federal courts "almost universally refuse to

derive protection for sexual orientation from the 'sex' prong").
25

See e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)

(holding that "distinctions in employment practices between men and women on the basis of
something other than immutable or [constitutionally] protected characteristics do not inhibit

employment opportunity" for purposes of Title VII). See also infra Part IV.B.
26

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (discussing the history of the Court's

treatment of the fundamental right to engage in "same-sex intimacy").
27

See id. at 2596.

28I do not mean to suggest that everyone who has a same-sex intimate encounter is homosexual or

bisexual. Sexual orientation has been described as "a person's enduring physical, romantic,
emotional and/or spiritual attraction to another person." It might well be that an individual identifies
as heterosexual but engages in same-sex sexual activity. DIANNE AVERY, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 455 (8th ed. 2010).

See, e.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091; EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols. 837 F.3d 1156, 1158
(11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a challenge to an employer's policy forbidding employees from wearing
dreadlocks, and noting "our precedent holds that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
29

immutable traits, and the . . . complaint does not assert that dreadlocks-though culturally associated
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arise in the context of an employer's adoption of gendered appearance and
grooming codes.30 Although their rationales differ,3 ' courts have often upheld
challenges to workplace policies that, for example, forbid men to wear earrings
or long hair but allow women to do either or both.32 To be clear, this article does
not make a normative argument that discrimination on the basis of gendered
grooming or appearance codes should be permissible. Other scholars have
cogently argued that such policies may perpetuate stereotypes and subordinate
women.33 Rather, this article demonstrates that exceptions to Title VII's broad
proscription against sex discrimination have been allowed. The grooming code
cases are merely one example. The article then seeks to use these existing
frameworks to argue that Obergefell might be used substantively to advance gay
rights beyond marriage in the employment context under Title VII. In short, it
argues that regardless of where the line is drawn between sex discrimination that
with race-are an immutable characteristic of black persons"); Campbell v. Alabama Dep't of Corr.,
No. 2:13-CV-00106-RDP, 2013 WL 2248086, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. May 20, 2013) (rejecting a claim
that a policy forbidding dreadlock hair style violated Title VII as hairstyle and hair length do not
involve immutable traits and fall outside the scope of Title VII); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20
F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1254, 1257 n.4 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (rejecting a challenge to employer's hair length
policy requiring men to wear their hair "above the collar," as discrimination is not based on
immutable traits or constitutionally protected activities as exemplified by holding that similar
grooming code policies that do not violate Title VII); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229,
231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Regarding a challenge to a hairstyle policy, the court said, "Even if the
grooming policy imposed different standards for men and women ... it would not violate Title VII".
. . [and it] "does not constitute prohibited sex discrimination . . . because . . . it does not regulate on

the basis of any immutable characteristic of the employees involved"). See generally Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L.

REV. 167, 205-06 (2004) [hereinafter Trait Discrimination].
3 See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance

Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 111, 1133-34 (2006).
3 See Erica Williamson, Moving Past Hippies and Harassment: A Historical Approach to Sex,
Appearance, and the Workplace, 56 Duke L.J. 681, 683-85 (2006) (noting that courts have taken
different approaches to the issue of grooming and appearance standards).
32 Compare Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112-113 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
a challenge to an employer dress and grooming code that required female employee to wear makeup, the court held that the code did not impose unequal burdens on either men or women and caused

no objective harm to the plaintiff) with Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1902 (rejecting a male employee's
challenge to an employer's hair length policy, because the alleged discrimination did not involve
immutable traits or fundamental rights). Professor Fisk explains that while challenges to grooming
policies have been rejected because of the immutability and fundamental rights analysis, courts have
found discrimination on occasion when the sex plus trait is not immutable. See Fisk, supra note 30,
at 1133-34 n.47 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
11 See e.g., Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The

Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 68 (1995) [hereinafter
Disaggregating Gender] (noting "the claim of numerous legal and cultural commentators that
conventionally feminine apparel has often been used as a mark of female subordination"); see also

id. at 64-69 (arguing that the law devalues that which is feminine by, for example, rejecting claims
by effeminate gay men, as well as claims by women, who challenge employer requirements that they
exhibit traits perceived as masculine).
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is permissible under Title VII and proscribed by it, Obergefell places sexual
orientation discrimination in the latter category. Understanding Obergefell in
this light not only signals an end to the discrimination gay individuals like
Valeria and Sophie have endured at the hands of the state, but also protects them
from the private-sector discrimination that, until recently, state action allowed
and encouraged.
This article is set forth in five parts. Part II is largely descriptive and focuses
on two aspects of Obergefell: (1) the Court's clarification that adult, private,
consensual, same-sex sexual intimacy is a fundamental right, protected by the
U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and (2) the
Court's recognition that leading mental health and medical groups consider
sexual orientation to be immutable. Part III examines how courts and the EEOC
have treated sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII and contains a
normative discussion which argues-consistent with the position of other
commentators, some courts, and the EEOC-that sexual orientation
discrimination should be recognized as sex discrimination for purposes of Title
VII. Part IV explores instances in which courts have permitted employers to
discriminate because of sex as a matter of judicial interpretation of Title VII.
One such instance involves the "sex plus" theory. Part V argues that under this
line of sex plus authority, sexual orientation discrimination is not only sexdiscrimination, but consistent with Obergefell, it is the type of discrimination
that Title VII forbids.
II.

SAME-SEX SEX AND IMMUTABLE TRAITS

Obergefell was a significant victory for gay rights. Still, it could have done
more to strengthen the argument that existing civil rights statutes that protect
individuals on the basis of sex also protect them from sexual orientation
discrimination. The Court, for instance, could have held that the marriage bans
imposed impermissible sex-based classifications in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Some judges addressing marriage
equality employed this analysis.34 Under this theory, the marriage bans might

See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 474 (9th Cir. 2014) (calling the sex discrimination argument a
"potentially persuasive answer to defendants' theory" in support of the bans); see also id. at 479
(Berzon, J., concurring) (opining that bans discriminate on the basis of gender); See Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Suzanne B.
34

Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and

Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 2087, 2121 (2014) (explaining that the argument had
received "little traction" in the courts). Chief Justice Roberts also posed the question during oral
&

arguments whether the challenged marriage bans constituted sex discrimination. Robert Barnes
Fred Barbash, Supreme CourtHears Arguments in Historic Gay-MarriageCase, WASH. POST (Apr.
28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts law/supreme-court-will-hear-historic-

arguments-in-gay-marriage-cases/2015/04/27/083d9302-ed24-1 le4-8666-al d756d0218estory.html.
Chief Justice Roberts asked, "If Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can't
I . . and the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn't that a straightforward question of

8
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have violated constitutional proscriptions against sex discrimination in two
distinct ways-as a matter of formal equality or under sex stereotyping theory.
Sex stereotyping theory is discussed later in this article. Suzanne Goldberg has
explained the formal equality argument.
[A] law authorizing a man to marry a woman but not to marry
a man (and a woman to marry a man but not a woman) is
discriminatory per se based on the category of sex. Put another
way, a rule that limits marriage to different-sex couples hinges
eligibility on the sex of one's partner. According to the
formal-equality argument, this kind of sex-based eligibility
rule is, by definition, discrimination based on sex. 35
Similarly, when an employer treats a male employee who has, or is
perceived to have, sex with other men differently from a female employee who
also has, or is perceived to have, sex with men, the disparate treatment is
because of the employee's sex. Because Title VII protects individuals from
discrimination on the basis of sex, litigants could have reasonably relied on a
sex-based equal protection analysis to argue that sexual orientation
discrimination is tantamount to unlawful sex discrimination under the statute as
well. The Court charted a different path.
A. Lawrence, Obergefell, and Same-Sex Sex
The Court in Obergefell relied principally on substantive due process to
strike down the marriage bans challenged in that case, although it also held that
the bans violated the Equal Protection Clause. 36 While other commentators
continue to unpack Obergefell at length,37 the discussion here is more modest.
Its focus is on two discrete points: (1) the Court's characterization of adult,
consensual, private same-sex sexual conduct as a fundamental right protected by
the Due Process Clause, an issue that had been heavily debated after the Court's
earlier gay-rights decision, Lawrence v. Texas;3 8 and (2) the Court's recognition

sexual discrimination?" Id. However, he did not address the issue in his dissent in Obergefell. See
generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
1s Goldberg, supra note 34, at 2099 (noting that formal equality "focuses on facial discrimination").
Compare Dionne L. Koller, Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-Feminist Critique of Title IX's Vision
for Gender Equity in Sports, 43 CONN. L. REv. 401, 417-21 (2010) (explaining that formal equality
is based on the notion that "like cases should be treated alike;" men and women are entitled to equal
treatment, and discussing the limits of the "sameness" argument) with Andrew Koppelman, Why
DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 208
(1994) (proposing an argument similar to the sameness argument).
36 See A New Birth ofFreedom?, supra note 11, at 148.
3 See id.; see also Hermann, supra note 11; Wolff, supra note 11; and Velte, supra note 11

(discussing generally Obergefell and the decision's implications).
31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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that leading medical and mental health organizations consider sexual orientation
to be an immutable trait.
1. Due Process and Fundamental Rights
Obergefell clarified that adult, consensual, same-sex intimacy is a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. That
statement is obvious considering Obergefell's holding that same-sex couples
have a fundamental right to marry. That right would mean little to most couples
if they also did not have a right to engage freely in conduct common to the
marital relationship. As Professor Harry Wellington has explained, although sex
occurs outside of marriage, "the state has undertaken to sponsor one institution
[marriage] that has at its core the love-sex relationship. That relationship
demands liberty in the practice of the sexual act." 39 Until relatively recently,
however, laws that outlawed same-sex sexual conduct were constitutional.
Moreover, after the Court held that such laws were unconstitutional, courts and
scholars disagreed on whether same-sex sex was a fundamental right.
The Court has set forth different approaches to determining whether an
asserted liberty interest under the Due Process Clause is a fundamental right. A
detailed discussion of these approaches and the implications of using one or the
other is beyond the scope of this article. 40 Suffice it to say that such a
determination matters. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
in pertinent part, forbids states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 41 The Clause on its face appears to speak
to the fairness of procedure to which an individual is entitled before being
denied the rights set forth in the Clause. The Court, however, has held that the
Clause contains a "substantive component that protects certain liberty interests
against state deprivation no matter what process is provided."42 Specifically, the
Clause protects "fundamental liberties .

.

. enumerated in the Bill of Rights" as

well as other unenumerated rights that pertain to "personal choices central to

39 Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 Yale L. J. 221, 292 (1973).
4 Other scholars have provided a detailed discussion of a history of the Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence. See e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution. Lawrence v.
Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (2003); A New Birth of Freedom?, supra note 11
(discussing Obergefell's approach to fundamental rights as well as the decision's potential
implications for this area of the law).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
See id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42,
49 (1st Cir. 2008) ("It has long been held that, despite their name, the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 'guarantee[ ] more than fair process."' (quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
41

42
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individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs." 43
Characterizing a right as fundamental under the Due Process clause "to a
great extent . . ." makes it ".

. . immune from federal or state regulation or

proscription."44 Under conventional analysis, if a law burdens a fundamental
right (like marriage), the government must prove that it has a compelling interest
justifying that burden and that the restriction placed on that right is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. If a fundamental right is not implicated, the
government's action is generally analyzed using a rational-basis standard, an
extremely deferential standard of review. 4 5
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court recognized that adult, consensual, same-sex
sexual intimacy was a protected liberty right under the Due Process Clause. 46
The lower courts subsequently debated, however, whether that right was a
fundamental right. Scholars also disagreed on how to characterize or analyze the
liberty interest Lawrence recognized. The next section addresses the controversy
and why Obergefell should settle it.
2. The Fundamental Right that Finally Spoke
Sodomy has become a metonym for same-sex intimacy or conduct.
Historically, sodomy laws were directed at opposite-sex and same-sex conduct,
but according to William Eskridge, by 1961 sodomy had become a "thoroughly
homosexualized term." 47 One way sexual orientation discrimination manifests is
by reducing gay people to a sex act-sodomy. 48 Linking homosexuals,
43

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.

4 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("By
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place
the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.").
See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1113 (2004) (explaining that
the "rational-basis test . . . as we have known it, will almost never lead to the invalidation of a state
law"). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
"only fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' qualify for
anything other than rational-basis scrutiny under the doctrine of 'substantive due process'); Witt v.
Dept. of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Substantive due process cases typically
apply strict scrutiny in the case of a fundamental right and rational basis review in all other cases.").
46 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
4

47

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-

2003 75 (2008) [hereinafter DISHONORABLE PASSIONS]; see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's
Curse: How Religion often Conflates Status, Belief and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination
Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 689 (2011) ("Between 1921 and 1961, state and federal governments
adopted hundreds of statutes imposing civil disabilities on 'homosexuals and other sex perverts,' to
use the terminology of the era.").
48 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak
Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1905-07, 1909 (2004) ("[B]eing gay or lesbian means being a
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particularly gay men, to sodomy occurs despite the fact that heterosexuals
49
engage in sodomy and many gays and lesbians may not do so at all. As long as
consensual sodomy remained unlawful, however, then linking homosexuals to
sodomy also linked them to criminal activity.so As Christopher Leslie explains,
once society determines that individuals are criminals, it becomes permissible to
deny them "rights and privileges" others take for granted.' The shadow of
criminality justified and resulted in discrimination against gay persons in a host
of areas, from public and private employment to custody and immigration
battles. 52 For these reasons, gay rights advocates early on recognized sodomy
3
laws as "the bedrock of legal discrimination against gays and lesbians."5 The
issue of same-sex sexual conduct eventually reached the Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 54 which held that the Due Process Clause did not confer a
5
fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy. ' Bowers was widely
criticized, but its holding would remain intact for another seventeen years when
the Court overturned that decision in Lawrence. 56 Lawrence held that
sodomite, which in turn means being a criminal."). Professor Susan J. Becker has referred to this
reductionist phenomenon as "behavior-identity compression," which describes "the process through
which individuals within the heteronormative, binary sexual paradigm craft an identity for outsiders
as one-dimensional sexual deviants." Susan J. Becker, Many Are Chilled, But Few Are Frozen: How
Transformative Learning in Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science will Lead to the Eventual
Demise of Legally Sanctioned DiscriminationAgainst Sexual Minorities in the United States, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 177, 194 (2006). One step in the identity construct involves the noncritical, generalized assumption that all sexual minorities engage in "deviant sexual behavior," such
as sodomy and oral sex. See id. at 194. According to Professor Becker, these assumptions are formed
about all sexual minorities without any actual evidence that they, in fact, have ever engaged in this
or any form of sexual conduct. See id. at 195. Moreover, "empirical data demonstrating that people
who identify as 'normal' heterosexuals engage in the condemned behavior is conveniently ignored."
Id.
49 See Becker, supra note 48, at 195.
5o See PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN
AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 170 (2000).

51 Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 509, 512
(2005).
52 See id.; see also Hunter, supra note 45, at 1133 (explaining that the sodomy laws were used most

often indirectly to penalize gay persons by denying gay and lesbian parents custody rights or by
refusing to employ gays and lesbians; there was a "logical connection between homosexuality and

violation of a sodomy law"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that Texas had acknowledged that the threat of conviction under its anti-sodomy
statute had collateral consequences, by subjecting homosexuals to discrimination in a variety of
ways); DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 47, at 67 ("The most important effect of sodomy laws
* . . was the extent to which they situated homosexuals outside the normal protections of the law.").
53 CAIN, supra note 50, at 170.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2005).
5

55

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.

56 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct

today.").
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homosexual persons enjoy a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in private, consensual sexual
intimacy.5 7
Although Lawrence ostensibly involved only the constitutionality of a state
imposing criminal penalties for a sex act, the Court recognized that sodomy
statutes did a great deal more. 1 By targeting intimate behavior largely
associated with homosexual persons, the laws also burdened intimate
relationships in which persons might seek to enter. According to the Court, "the
laws have ... far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior[;] . . . [they] seek to control a personal relationship that
. . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals."59
In striking down the Texas sodomy statute, the Lawrence Court relied
principally on a series of cases discussing other fundamental rights and
particularly the fundamental right to privacy, which the Court had recognized in
earlier decisions.60 According to the Court, its extensive privacy jurisprudence
demonstrated that the constitution grants individuals the autonomy to make
certain highly personal choices about their life and destiny, including issues
surrounding marriage, procreation, family relationships, and child rearing. 6 ' It
explained that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
62
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."
Considering the precedent it cited in Lawrence to strike down the Texas
sodomy ban, the Court appeared to hold that the intimacy right recognized in
Lawrence was a fundamental right.63 Nowhere did the Court explicitly say so, a
fact that Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion: the Court neither

" See id. at 5647 (determining that the Texas sodomy statute "seek[s] to control a personal
relationship that . .. is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals");

see also id. at 577-78 (quoting with approval Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in Bowers, which
explained that "individual decisions [by married or single persons] . . . concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship . . . are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment").

'8 See Tribe, supra note 48, at 1903-04 (explaining that the principle evil of the sodomy statute was
neither "punishing some people for the only mode of sexual gratification available to them" nor
arbitrary enforcement of the sodomy law, but rather it was "stigmatization of intimate personal

relationships between people of the same sex").
' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
o See id. at 564-65 (noting that the "most pertinent beginning point [in this line of cases] is our

decision in Griswold," which struck down a state law that barred access by married couples to
contraceptives (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
61 See id. at 574.
62

6 See Tribe, supranote 48, at 1916-17.
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"declare[d] that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' nor subjected the
Texas law to strict scrutiny review. 64 That omission did not go unnoticed.
Lower courts divided over how to characterize and treat the right articulated
by the Court in Lawrence. 65 For instance, in Lofton v. Secretary of the
Department of Children and Family Services, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
challenge to a Florida law that bars gays and lesbians from adopting children,
and in doing so addressed the scope of the Court's holding in Lawrence.66 It
explained that "[n]owhere [in Lawrence] .

.

. did the Court characterize [the right

'

to sexual intimacy] as "'fundamental."' 67 It further noted that "the Lawrence
Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper standard when fundamental rights
are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis
grounds." 68 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied a heightened standard of
review to analyze the constitutionality of the now repealed Don't Ask, Don't
Tell ("DADT") statute. 69 The court recognized that Lawrence did not explicitly
articulate the standard of review applicable to claims that the plaintiffs' right to
same-sex sexual intimacy was being violated."0 However, among other reasons,
because of the privacy cases on which Lawrence relied in addressing the liberty
right before the Court, the Ninth Circuit determined that something more than
rational basis review was required to determine the constitutionality of DADT. 7
Scholars have also debated how the liberty right addressed in Lawrence
should be articulated and analyzed.72 Laurence Tribe, for example, dismissed as

* Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Compare Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Lawrence
did not find a fundamental right to engage in private sexual conduct under the Constitution and
applying rational basis scrutiny to claim that government employer violated petitioner's rights by
reprimanding her for her private, sexual activity) and Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Child. & Fam.
Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2004) (Lawrence neither identified a fundamental right and
applied only rational basis review to the Texas statute) with Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 53, 56 (1st
Cir. 2008) (holding that Lawrence recognized "a narrowly defined liberty interest in adult
6

consensual sexual intimacy in the confines of one's home and one's own private life") (rejecting
argument that Lawrence did not recognize a "fundamental right" because it did not explicitly use
those words; the Court has recognized a protected liberty interest in prior cases without
denominating the rights "fundamental").
66

Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815-17.

67 Id. at 816.
68 Id. at 817.
69

Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008).

o See id. at 815.
' See id. at 818-19 (declining to apply strict scrutiny because Lawrence did not do so, and instead
adopting a test that balanced the rights of the government against the "significant liberty interest"
recognized in Lawrence).
72 The scholarship on Lawrence is voluminous, and, of course, the works of only a few scholars are

discussed here.
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irrelevant the Court's failure to delineate a precise standard of review in
Lawrence." He explained that considering the privacy cases on which the Court
relied and the strictness of the standard it used in striking down the Texas
statute, Lawrence obviously recognized a fundamental right.7 4 Nan Hunter has
opined that although the Court did not use the term "fundamental" in Lawrence,
it drew analogies to cases that had identified such rights." She contends that
regardless of how the right recognized in Lawrence is labeled, the Court
considered it to be equivalent to other fundamental rights and thus accorded it
the same level of protection as those rights." In contrast, Randy Barnett argues
that there is "not even the pretense of a 'fundamental right"' addressed in
Lawrence that rebuts the ordinary "presumption of constitutionality" in nonfundamental rights due process cases. Rather, he contends that the Court in
Lawrence recognized a right requiring a "'presumption of liberty' that requires
the government to justify its restriction on [the] liberty" right rather than the
challenger having to prove the liberty interest asserted is a fundamental right.78
The many interpretations of Lawrence offered by courts and commentators
attest to the decision's lack of clarity as to the right at issue in the case. A dozen
years after Lawrence was decided, Obergefell clarifies that the issue in
Lawrence was a fundamental right. In response to the states' argument that the
Court should proceed cautiously and let the democratic process decide the issue
of marriage equality, the Court explained "[o]f course the Constitution
contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as
that process does not abridge fundamental rights." 9 It noted that "[t]his [was]
not the first time the Court ha[d] been asked to adopt a cautious approach to
recognizing and protecting fundamental rights."so It had also been asked to
proceed cautiously in Bowers and by doing so "upheld state action that denied
gays and lesbians a fundamental right and caused them pain and humiliation."8 1
That, it continued, is why Bowers, as the Court recognized in Lawrence, was

7

Tribe, supranote 48, at 1916-17.

74 Id. (noting that "[t]he practice of announcing such a standard . . . is of relatively recent vintage, is

often more conclusory than informative, has frequently been subjected to cogent criticism, and has
not shown itself worthy of being enshrined as a permanent fixture in the armament of constitutional
analysis").
7 Hunter, supra note 45, at 1114, 1117 (relying on cases involving privacy as well as the "freedom
of thought, belief [and] expression" (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003))).
76 Hunter, supra note 45, at 1114,
1117.
n Barnett, supra note 40, at 35.
7

1 Id. at 36.

" Obergefell v. Hodges, 135. S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
so Id. at 2606.
" Id. (emphasis added).
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wrong the day it was decided.82 Whether courts and scholars will now agree that
the right to same-sex sexual intimacy, which was denied to gays and lesbians in
Bowers, is a fundamental right remains to be seen. 83 However, although
Lawrence was vague, the Court did not mince words in Obergefell. It quite
clearly discussed Bowers and Lawrence as involving fundamental rights.
Some authority that rejected the fundamental rights analysis after Lawrence
did so because of the potential implications for other due process claims that
would follow. The concern was that it would "'break new ground' in the field of
fundamental rights." 84 That of course is what Obergefell has done, which should
undermine concerns about the breadth of Lawrence. The Court in Obergefell
explicitly broke with the fundamental rights analysis set forth in prior cases.8 5 In
any event, the point here is not to discuss fully the implications of Lawrence or
Obergefell as a matter of due process. It is to discuss descriptively what the
Court said in Obergefell about the fundamental right recognized in Lawrence
and, as set forth later in this article, the potential implications for Title VII.
B. The "Unchangeableness"of "Gayness"
The second aspect of Obergefell relevant for present purposes is the Court's
recognition that leading mental health and medical organizations consider sexual
orientation to be immutable, a characterization that none of the four dissenting
opinions challenged. Justice Kennedy began the opinion by acknowledging the
centrality of "immutability" to the plaintiffs' argument. He first explains the
"transcendent importance of marriage" and that it "has existed for millennia and
across civilizations."8 6 He acknowledged that these historical references, as well
as the Court's references in its various decisions discussing marriage,

82 Id.; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is
not correct today . . . and now is overruled.").
1 See Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2015) (refusing to read Obergefell as
requiring heightened scrutiny to a sexual orientation claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause,
declining to hold that "homosexuals enjoy special protections under the Equal Protection Clause,"
and noting that the plaintiffs failed to "explore the relevant cases" concerning the level of scrutiny to
apply in the context of sexual orientation).
8 Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 (11th Cit. 2004)
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
as See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (acknowledging that prior fundamental
rights cases had "insist[ed] that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most
circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices[,]" but rejecting that
approach in the context of certain fundamental rights, including the right to marry); see also id. at
2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority rejects the Courts usual approach to a
fundamental rights inquiry, which focuses on whether the right is "objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997))).
" See id., at 2593-94 (majority opinion).

16

The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice

[20:2017]

contemplated the institution in its traditional form-a union between a man and
woman. " The traditional understanding of marriage is where respondents
wanted to begin and end the issue of marriage equality. According to them, there
is no such thing as a marriage between same sex persons." They argued that to
rob the institution of its gendered differentiation would demean it."

'

Justice Kennedy rejected that characterization, explaining that petitioners'
goal is not to demean marriage but to honor and support the institution and in
the process also gain access to its privileges and responsibilities.90 This they
cannot do unless they are able to marry individuals of the same sex. Otherwise
their "immutable nature" would place the institution beyond their reach.9
He returned to the nature of homosexuality after discussing the history of
unequal treatment of gays and lesbians in the United States and the Western
world for much of the twentieth century. 92 During that period, until 1973, the
American Psychiatric Association considered homosexuality to be a mental
illness. 93 He explained that "[o]nly in more recent years have psychiatrists and
others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human
sexuality and immutable." 94
The significance of the Court's reference to sexual orientation and
particularly homosexuality as immutable and natural has broad implications.
The immutability issue is often raised both in the context of Equal Protection
jurisprudence, 95 and as discussed later, with regard to judicial interpretation of
" Id. at 2594.
8 Id.
89 Id.
90

Id.

"

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (explaining petitioners' argument that their "immutable nature

dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment").
92

Id. at 2596.

93 Id.

9 Id. The Court's use of the term "immutable" is notable. The amicus brief by medical and mental
health organizations to which it cites does not use that word. Rather, "rely[ing] [among other things]

on the best empirical research available," amici contended that for most gay men and lesbians sexual
orientation is not a "voluntary choice." See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al.,

as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004713. Moreover, they stated that sexual orientation
change efforts "have not been shown to be effective or safe." See id. at 7-9. See also Judith
Glassgold et al., Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N TASK FORCE, 1, 3 (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/Igbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf
Based on these findings, the Court characterized sexual orientation as being immutable.

9 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd on other grounds, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring); see also Wolff, supra note 11, at 31 (explaining that Obergefell may prompt courts to

apply heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection Clause challenges to laws that burden gays and
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Title VII as well. 9 6 Beyond that, the Court's discussion may undermine an
argument about sexual orientation that has been a staple for opponents of LGBT
equality. Until recently homosexuality was not only classified as a mental illness
by many in the scientific community but was also considered to be a choice, a
condition that could and should be changed. 9 Some members of society
continue to hold this view; although, as Obergefell notes, leading mental health
98
and medical professionals no longer do so.

.

Opponents of LGBT equality have long relied on arguments that
homosexuality is both morally wrong and mutable as reasons not to legitimize it
by granting gay and lesbian persons "special rights," which essentially has
meant any civil rights at all. 99 Anti-gay organizations and individuals have often
cited morality and mutability as bases for opposing legislation aimed at
eradicating the discrimination that gay and lesbian persons have long suffered in
such areas as employment, education, and public accommodations. Indeed, in
tracing the history of attempts by Congress to pass a civil rights bill protecting
gay and lesbian persons, Chai Feldblum has explained that the "key objection .

lesbians because "the components of a core equal protection holding are scattered throughout the
majority opinion[ and t]he Court describes the identity of LGBT people as 'immutable'). Courts
apply heightened scrutiny to laws that burden suspect or quasi-suspect classes. To determine whether
government action affecting a particular group warrants such scrutiny, courts consider a number of
factors, including whether the group possesses an "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing" trait
defining it as a discrete group. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 180-81. The Court has never held that
immutability is necessary to determine whether a particular class receives heightened scrutiny. See
id. at 181. See also Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1510 (2011) (explaining that the Court has
never held that immutability is an indispensable factor in the heightened scrutiny analysis).
96

See infra Part IV.B.

9 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 39-40 (2007)
[hereinafter COVERING].

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596; see also Brief for the American Psychological Association et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004713, at 7-8 (explaining that the first Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders classified homosexuality as a mental disorder, but that
"mainstream mental health professionals and researchers" have not held that view for decades).
98

* See Chai R. Feldblum, The FederalGay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING CHANGE:
SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 214 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000) (explaining

that opposition to gay civil rights bill has not changed much since the 1970s: "passage of such [laws]
would result in the government's legislating a moral view of homosexuality at odds with the
majority's"); see also Peter Sprigg & Travis Weber, Issue Analysis: Obama Executive Order on
"Sexual Orientation" and "Gender Identity," FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL 4 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.frc.org/EF/EFl4127.pdf (arguing against LGBT protective legislation, in part, because
these traits are not "inborn, involuntary, immutable, innocuous, and/or in the Constitution of the
United States"); Brief for the Respondents at 47-48, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-571), 2015 WL 1384104 (arguing against using heightened scrutiny to challenge
marriage bans under the Equal Protection Clause because sexual orientation is not "an obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic" and is unlike "race, sex, ethnicity, [or] illegitimacy").
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. has always been that it endorses immorality . . . .""0 This objection, she notes,
has also been accompanied by the claim that homosexuals are not "bona fide
minorities" because unlike race, sex, and national origin, homosexual behavior
can be changed if the individual wants to change. 1o' Some may find that
argument to be reasonable, particularly if the mutability of sexual orientation
status is taken as fact. As one commentator has noted, it is certainly fair to ask
"why not allow discrimination if gayness is essentially changeable and
wrong?" 102 The morality argument aside, Obergefell may undermine the
mutability argument. At the very least, it will be difficult for lower courts
considering whether sexual orientation is an immutable trait (for Equal
Protection purposes or otherwise) to ignore Obergefell's discussion of the
modern understanding of the issue by leading professional organizations.
In sum, Obergefell not only requires marriage equality nationwide but also
(1) clarifies that adult, same-sex, consensual sexual conduct is a fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2)
recognizes that leading mental health and medical organizations consider sexual
orientation to be both immutable and a natural expression of sexuality. Before
turning to how Obergefell's fundamental rights and immutability discussions
have the potential to extend Title VII to cover gay and lesbian employees, this
article first examines in the next section how courts have treated the issue of
sexual orientation discrimination under that statute.
III.

TITLE VII AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Title VII's principal aim was to address rampant discrimination against
African Americans. 103 Aside from race and color, the statute also protects
individuals on the basis of sex, religion, and national origin. Sexual orientation
is not explicitly included among the traits the statute protects.' 04 For decades,
members of Congress have repeatedly tried but failed to enact legislation that
would protect employees against sexual orientation discrimination. 10I With
" Feldblum, supra note 99, at 186.
11Id.
102 WALTER FRANK, LAW AND THE GAY RIGHTS STORY: THE LONG SEARCH FOR EQUAL JUSTICE IN

A DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 104 (2014).
103 Joseph Kattan, Employee Opposition to Discriminatory Employment Practices:Protection From

Reprisal Under Title VII, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 222 (1977) ("[The] new recognition of the
moral imperative of enhancing black Americans' social and economic standing, together with the
fear of growing racial tension and violence, motivated Congress to enact the comprehensive Civil
Rights Act of 1964."); see also United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 229 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the reality of employment discrimination
against Negroes provided the primary impetus for passage of Title VII.").
'

04

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012).

'o William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Casefor Redefining "Because of
Sex" to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev.
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explicit federal employment protection elusive, gay individuals have argued that
discrimination because of sexual orientation is proscribed by the statute's
prohibition of sex discrimination. The argument has met with mixed results
among the courts.
A. The Meaning of "Sex"
Early courts universally rejected the argument that by including the word
sex in the statute, Congress intended to protect individuals from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. They reasoned that Congress intended for the
term to carry its traditional meaning; that is, "sex" refers to biological sex and
nothing more. "o However, it is not at all clear what Congress intended by
including sex in Title VII.
Legislative history on the matter is sparse."o 7 The meaning and scope of
"sex" were never discussed in legislative committee hearings.'o It also was not
one of the traits originally protected by the proposed legislation. Rather, an
amendment to add it was raised during debate in the House by Representative
Howard Smith, a Virginia congressman, who opposed Title VII. 109 It is
commonly understood that his proposal, as he put it, to "protect the most

487, 495-99 (2011) (tracing the history of the legislation attempting to address employment
discrimination, in particular the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equality Act of 1974, and the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA")).
106 See generally DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Mowery v. Esambia Cty. Util.
Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006 WL 327965, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2006) (defining sex to
mean "one's biological makeup as a man or a woman"); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d
325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining "that Congress by its proscription of sex discrimination
intended only to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and females").
"o' See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing
legislative history regarding the "sex" provision to be meager and offering little guidance as to
Congressional intent).
'os See 110 CONG. REc. 2582 (1964) (testimony of Representative Green that there was no testimony
regarding the amendment before the Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on Education and
Labor and that no organization petitioned either committee to add sex to the measure); see also
Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 600
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
'0 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 568 (3d ed.

2011); 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964) (explaining that "it is an indisputable fact that all throughout
industry women are discriminated against in that, just generally speaking, they do not get as high
compensation for their work as do the majority sex"). See also Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw: The Disaggregationof Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
14-15 (1995) (noting that although legislative history is sparse on the issue, sex was added to Title
VII against a "rich congressional legislative history concerning the equal rights of women" including
failed attempts to pass an Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Trait Discrimination,
supra note 29, at 168-69 (describing how ."sex' was introduced into the Civil Rights Act one day
before its passage," possibly as a "last ditch attempt to kill the Act").
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important sex" was a last-minute attempt to scuttle the bill.'"o Unsurprisingly,
during the brief floor debate regarding the amendment, neither Representative
Smith nor anyone else who spoke in support of or against it mentioned
homosexuality, sexual orientation, or gay people."' Nothing in the legislative
history suggests Congress thought about sexual orientation at all.1 1 2 Still, it is
unlikely that legislators proposing the amendment intended for it to protect
homosexuals, as a class, in the same way that Title VII was intended to protect,
say, African-Americans. The social and political climate for gays and lesbians in
the country at the time undermines the argument.113
None of this, however, means that discrimination because of sex cannot
arise when it is motivated by an employee's sexual orientation, whether that
orientation is heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or asexual. 114 While most
courts that have addressed the issue have held that Title VII does not protect
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, numerous scholars, a handful of
courts, and more recently the EEOC have reached a contrary conclusion.

110 Trait Discrimination, supra note 29, at 168. In support of that position, opponents of the
amendment voiced concern that it was raised as an attempt to defeat the bill and that sex should be

included in stand-alone legislation. See 110 CONG REC. at 2577, 2578 (1964) (opposing the
amendment and calling it "ill-timed" and "illogical" and expressing surprise that Representative
Smith had raised it); see id. at 2581-82 (showing opposition from Representative George (a
Congresswoman from Oregon) to the amendment; Representative George argued that adding sex to

the bill "may very well-be used to help destroy . .. the bill by some of the very people who today
support it"); see also id. at 2582 (recounting the testimony of Representative Roosevelt who
contended that the House on Education and Labor had agreed that it would later consider a bill to
address sex). But see Legal Protections,supra note 23, at 1339 (arguing that while Smith was no fan

of the Civil Rights Act, he had been a supporter of initiatives to advance women's rights).
11 See 110 CONG. REC. at 2577-81 (detailing that after Representative Smith raised the issue,
several others spoke in favor of the amendment, including several Congresswomen). Particularly
relevant is the testimony of Representative Frances P. Bolton of Ohio, Representative Martha

Griffiths of Michigan, and Representative Green of Oregon. Representative Griffiths was concerned
that unless the amendment regarding "sex" passed, every group would be protected by Title VII
except for white women. See id. at 2578-79; see also Legal Protections, supra note 23, at 2580

("[A] vote against this amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or
his daughter, or his sister."). Representative Green of Oregon was the only woman who spoke
against amending Title VIl to add "sex." See id. at 2581 (acknowledging wide-spread discrimination
on the basis of sex but arguing that it pales in comparison to the discrimination against African
Americans). Representative Green was also concerned that the amendment might be later used by
some of its supporters to defeat passage of the bill. See id.
112 Capers, supra note 23, at 1168 ("Nothing in the legislative
history suggests that Congress
considered whether the word 'sex' encompassed sexuality or sexual practices.").

"'See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 (E.D.
La. 2002 Sept. 16, 2002) (When Title VII was enacted, ". . .the social climate of the early sixties,
sexual identity and sexual orientation related issues remained shrouded in secrecy and individuals

having such issues generally remained closeted.").
114 See infra Part III.B(2)(a).
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1. Sex: A Matter of Biology
Whether discrimination because of one's sexual orientation is actionable
under Title VII has been a matter of fierce debate in legal scholarship and
among the judiciary. 1" As explained, early courts adopted a biological
reductionist argument to reject claims raised by gay and lesbian as well as
transgender employees." 6 One early case, DeSantis v. Pacific Telegraph and
Telephone Co., ' sets forth this position. There, several gay and lesbian
plaintiffs filed separate actions alleging they had been discriminated against
"because of their homosexuality."" 8 The district court dismissed each complaint
and in a consolidated appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed. All of the plaintiffs
alleged being fired, harassed or otherwise discriminated against because of their
"homosexuality."" 9 In particular, one plaintiff alleged that he had been fired for
wearing a small gold hoop earring, and thus the employer's discrimination was
based on his effeminacy. 2 0 Two lesbian plaintiffs alleged they were harassed
and then fired because of their same-sex relationship.121 The male plaintiffs
22
further asserted a disparate impact claim,1 alleging that a higher incidence of
homosexuality exists among males than among females, and thus the employer's
policy of discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation disproportionately
affected men in violation of Title VII.1 23
The court found that none of the allegations showed discrimination because
but pertained more to discrimination based on "sexual preference" or
sex
of
"homosexuality." According to the court, the proscription against "sex
discrimination" was meant "to ensure that men and women are treated equally,
absent a bona fide relationship between the qualifications for the job and the
person's sex."'2 4 The court also noted that Congress on several occasions had
attempted but failed to enact a statute to protect employees on the basis of
"sexual preference," failures that the court found probative of Congress's view

1
116

See infra Part 11.B.(l)-(2).
See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *3-4 n.51-52 (collecting cases as to transgender plaintiffs).

"1 DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
"*

Id. at 328.

II9 Id.
20

1

Id. at 328, 331.

121

Id. at 329.

122

See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009) (describing how Title VII allows a

"disparate treatment" claim, where the employer is alleged to have engaged in intentional
discrimination, and/or a disparate impact claim, where an employer enacts a "facially neutral
practice[] that, in fact, [is] . . . 'discriminatory in operation' by more harshly impacting a protected
group).
123 See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329.
124 id.
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that Title VII did not protect employees on that basis.1 2 According to the court,
under a biology-based understanding of sex, discrimination against a male
employee because of his effeminacy is not discrimination against him because
of his sex. Likewise, an employer does not engage in unlawful discrimination
when it treats male employees who prefer male sexual partners differently than
it treats female employees who prefer male sexual partners. It determined that
such an allegation, as well as the allegation concerning disparate impact, is no
more than an attempt to "'bootstrap' Title VII protection for homosexuals." 1 26
Notwithstanding DeSantis, it seems obvious that when an employer treats a
male employee who sleeps with men differently from a female employee who
does the same, the employer's action violates Title VII as a matter of formal
equality.127 Moreover, relying on the sex stereotyping theory that was set forth
in the Court's seminal decision Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,1 28 some courts
have begun to acknowledge that sex under Title VII does not refer exclusively to
biology. That acknowledgment has resulted in some protection from
discrimination for LGBT individuals under Title VII.
2. Sex Discrimination as Sex Stereotyping
Price Waterhouse had nothing to do with sexual orientation. Ann Hopkins
was a married heterosexual woman who applied for partnership, and her
application was placed on hold (and effectively denied) at least in part because
of stereotypical notions of how she (and other women) should behave.1 29 In her
reviews by other partners, she was described as "macho" and told to take "a
course at charm school."' One partner said that at one time she had been "a
tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager]" but that she had
matured into a more appealing lady-like candidate.' 1 The partner responsible
for delivering the blow about her promotion told her that to improve her chances
she should walk, talk, and dress more femininely, "wear make-up, have her hair
styled and wear jewelry."'3 2 The Court held that such statements showed that
some of the negative reactions to Ms. Hopkins were because she was a
woman.' 33 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan determined that

125

id.

126

See id. at 330-31.

127 See generally Goldberg, supra note 34 and accompanying discussion.
28
129

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
See id. at 233-34.

"o See id. at 235.
131 See id.
132 See
3

id.

See id. at 256-58.
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13 4
these comments demonstrated that sex stereotyping was at work. According to

the plurality opinion, when an employer acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive or that she must not be, the employer has acted
because of sex.' Objecting to aggressiveness in women when their position
requires such a trait places women in an untenable Catch-22-out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. 136 That was
undoubtedly true for Ms. Hopkins, who had to be aggressive to be successful but
was then punished for acting that way.
Justice Brennan did not limit the prohibition on sex stereotyping to
employees like Hopkins who find themselves in Catch-22 situations. 137
According to Justice Brennan, gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions to comply with Title VII's nondiscrimination mandate. 138 He
suggested that Title VII is violated whenever an employee is forced to conform
to gender stereotypes by stating that,
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
39
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."'
Price Waterhouse makes clear that sex and gender are treated the same
under Title VII. " Sex may refer to biology; gender, however, has been
described as "socially constructed roles, behaviors and activities" that society

134 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
135 See id.
13 Id.; See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul ofa Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. 757, 762-63 (2013) [hereinafter Soul of a Woman] (arguing that the Court's

statements regarding the double bind in which Ms. Hopkins was placed might have been read to
mean that the Court was limiting the reach of Price Waterhouse to those situations where women, in
particular, are treated differently than men in ways that limit their opportunities. However, the

Court's holding "extended well beyond double-binds." The Court's opinion makes clear that Title
VII proscribes all sex stereotyping.).
13 See Soul of a Woman, supra note 136, at 763.
38

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart,

435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978)).
9

I at 251.
Id.

See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1977)); Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No.
012013380, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 n.4 (July 16, 2015) (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)); Franke, supra note 109, at 95; Soul ofa Woman, supra note 136, at 771
("Title VII . . .prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and gender.").
140
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considers appropriate for one's sex. 141 Punishing Ms. Hopkins because of her
aggressiveness or for being perceived as macho evidenced that Price
Waterhouse believed that she and other women should not exhibit those traits,
which society has deemed appropriate for boys or men but not for girls or
women.
After Price Waterhouse, every federal circuit considering the matter has
recognized that discrimination based on one's failure to conform to gender
norms may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.1'42 Failing to conform
to gender norms with regard to whom one should be attracted, marry, or have
sex with would seem to fit comfortably within the scope of Price Waterhouse.14 3
If an employer discriminates against a woman because she is not sexually
attracted to men, although "real" women should be, then the employer has acted
on the basis of a sex stereotype. Just as Price Waterhouse unlawfully
discriminated against Ann Hopkins because she was too macho and acted too
aggressively (behavior it rewarded men for exhibiting), it also would unlawfully
discriminate against her for being sexually intimate with or marrying another
woman-which, like aggressiveness, is associated with behavior reserved for
men.
Numerous scholars have recognized that one of the prime motivations for
discrimination against gays and lesbians is discomfort with the manner in which
homosexuality departs from traditional gender roles: in short, real men and real

141 See Cynthia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronormativity, and

the Murder of Transgender Women, 66 Hastings L.J. 77, 87 (2014) (defining the terms "sex" and
"gender"); See generally Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity
and Gender Expression: What is the Diference Between Sex and Gender?, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS'N, www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) ("Sex is assigned at
birth, refers to one's biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with

physical attributes" whereas "[g]ender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities
and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for boys and men or girls and women.").
142

See EEOC v. Bob Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that

discrimination because of an employee's failure to conform to gender norms may be evidence of
actionable "sex discrimination" under Title VII, a position that has been adopted by every federal

circuit court of appeals to have considered the issue); see also Friedman, supra note 23, at 219
(noting that "where a plaintiff alleges discrimination associated with his or her unconventional

behavior, attire, or other form of presentation of self, the courts usually . .. reject defense motions to
dismiss. . . .").
See Friedman, supra note 23, at 205. See also Koppelman, supra note 35, at 234 ("It should be
clear from ordinary experience that the stigmatization of the homosexual has something to do with
the homosexual's supposed deviance from traditional sex roles."); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The
1'

Ultimate

Gender Stereotype:

Equalizing Gender-ConJbrming And

Gender-Nonconforming

Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 465, 490-91 (2004) (suggesting that "sexual
orientation-based harassment" stemming from nonconformity with behaviors commonly expected of
a "real man" or "real woman" constitutes the "ultimate gender stereotype").
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women should not be attracted to a member of the same sex.
Friedman explains:

25

144

As Joel

Disapprobation of an individual's homosexuality or
transgender identity is nothing more or less than
condemnation of that person's failure or refusal to adhere to
traditional expectations of how a "real" man or woman should
live his or her life and/or present him or herself to the outside
world. Whether it is based on how they dress, how they carry
themselves, how they groom themselves, or with whom they
choose to engage in sexual conduct, these decisions are, at
their core, based on a prejudice against individuals'
nonconformity to those societally generated norms of behavior
imposed on members of each of the two biological sexes. 145
Despite the ample scholarship examining the connection between sexual
orientation and sex discrimination, courts are divided on this issue. I briefly
explain this split below.
B. Sexual Orientationand Sex
As explained below, most courts have rejected gender stereotyping claims
where the stereotype at issue is or involves sexual orientation. Other courts and
the EEOC have allowed such claims, and in some instances, have also
determined that sexual orientation discrimination is per se discrimination

'" See Soucek, supra note 23, at 726 ("Following Price Waterhouse to its logical conclusion would
appear to require that sexual orientation be brought, along with the rest of the spectrum of gender
stereotypes, under the protective umbrella of Title VII."); Kramer, supra note 143, at 490 ("The
primary thrust of . . . discrimination [against gays and lesbians], deriv[es] from the idea that
homosexuality departs from traditional gender roles and that "real" men and women should not be
attracted to a member of the same sex."); Capers, supra note 23, at 1059 ("Discrimination against
lesbians and gays simultaneously flows from and perpetuates traditional notions of appropriate sex
roles."); MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, IT'S NOT OVER: GETTING BEYOND TOLERANCE, DEFEATING
HOMOPHOBIA, AND WINNING TRUE EQUALITY 48-51 (2015) (discussing studies that indicate

continued implicit bias against gay people as well as studies that indicate that the "triggers at the root
of homophobia" may lie in biases toward gender nonconforming individuals).
Some suggest the discrimination may stem from sincerely held religious beliefs about religious
teachings about homosexuality. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and
Versatiles: What Straight Views of PenetrativePreference Could Mean For Sexuality Claims Under
Price Waterhouse, 123 Yale L.J. 714, 730 (2013). However, even where this is the case, such beliefs
are most likely grounded in biblical or religious doctrine concerning the proper roles for men and
women in sexual relations. See, e.g., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 47, at 1-2 (explaining
that the primary textual basis for criminalizing sodomy in the American colonies was the biblical
passage forbidding men to lie with other men as they would with women).
145 Friedman, supranote 23, at 226; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 495 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that

discrimination against LGBT persons "reflects, in large part, disapproval of their nonconformity
with gender-based expectations").
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because of sex. This section demonstrates that the law in this area is, to say the
least, muddy.
1. Gay Exceptionalism
Every court of appeals to decide the matter has held that Title VII does not
protect employees on the basis of sexual orientation.14 6 Many courts distinguish
sex stereotyping claims based on sexual orientation from other forms of gender
non-conforming behavior, such as workplace appearance, behavior, and
mannerisms. 14 7 These courts proclaim that a sex stereotyping claim may not be
based on a failure to conform to gender norms regarding one's actual or
perceived sexual practices.1 48 The plaintiff in that instance is a "bootstrap[per],"
See, e.g., Ettsity v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
sexual orientation discrimination based on "a person's status as a transsexual is not discrimination
because of sex under Title VII."); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)
(noting that "sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title VII");
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that "[t]he law is wellsettled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that .. . Title VII does not prohibit
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation"); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (Title VII does not protect against sexual orientation
discrimination); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)
(Title VII does not proscribe sexual orientation harassment). See also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk
Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the court's inquiry does "not focus
on the sexuality of the plaintiff in determining whether a Title VII violation has occurred"); Soucek,
supra note 23, at 722 (explaining that "courts have almost universally refused to derive protection
for sexual orientation from Title VII's "sex" prong"). In Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Col., S. Bend,
consistent with other courts of appeals, a panel of the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII does not
protect individuals on the basis of sexual orientation. No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 4039703 at *2 (7th
Cir. 2016). On October 11, 2016, the opinion was vacated and the court granted a petition to rehear
the case en banc.
147 See Pagan v. Gonzalez, 430 F. App'x. 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (determining
that a claim of
146

discrimination based on sexual orientation was not cognizable under Title VII, and "offensive
comments relating to [the plaintiffs] sexual orientation" do not establish a gender stereotyping claim
absent "any evidence to show that the discrimination was based on [the plaintiffs] acting in a
masculine manner"); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a
genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the plaintiffs harassment stemmed from
his sexual orientation or his effeminacy and only the latter is actionable under Title VII); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2006) (regarding sex stereotypes, Title VII does
not protect against discrimination because of sexual orientation but only gender nonconforming
behavior that is readily demonstrable in the workplace, such as appearance and behavior); Silas v.
Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, No. CA 15-3296, 2016 WL 164916, at *6 n.13 (E.D. La. Jan. 13,
2016) (determining that the plaintiff did not state a stereotyping claim by alleging that "he is
bisexual and his sexual practices did not conform to the gender stereotypes" particularly when the
plaintiff's complaint was "silent about his workplace appearance or behavior or perceived
appearance or behavior"); Burrows v. Coll. of Cent. Fla., No. 5:14-CV-197-OC-30PRL, 2015 WL
4250427, at *9 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2015) (characterizing the plaintiffs claim as a "repackaged claim
for discrimination based on sexual orientation," which is not actionable under Title VII; gender
stereotyping claim must relate to traits demonstrable in the workplace, such as behaviors,
mannerisms, and appearances).
148 See Soucek, supra note 23, at 726; Kramer, supra note 143, at 410; Capers, supra note 23, at
1160; SIGNORILE, supra note 144, at 48-5 1; see also Friedman, supra note 23, at 218 (noting that
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attempting to amend Title VII to add sexual orientation as a protected trait when
Congress has not seen fit to do so.149
Courts have not exactly turned a blind eye to the connection between sexual
orientation and sex stereotyping. Rather, they engage in a type of gay
exceptionalism when addressing the issue. The Second Circuit, for instance, has
explained that "[w]hen utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff . .. gender
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator . . . for the

simple reason that '[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should
behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and
homosexuality."" 50 To root out a sexual orientation claim masquerading as sex
stereotyping, courts have held that the sex stereotyping plaintiff must allege the
discrimination was based on specific gender-nonconforming behavior that does
not involve sexual orientation.' 5 ' For instance, the male who is harassed because
of his observed effeminacy (or his female counterpart because of her
masculinity) would arguably, at least in some courts, be protected under a Price
Waterhouse theory. 152 This approach to sex stereotyping claims has offered
protection to some gay and lesbian employees who outwardly behave in gender
nonconforming ways. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter has explained, however, that
these cases have hardly been slam dunks even for that group. Even where a
plaintiff carefully pleads harassment because of gender stereotypes associated
with behavior or mannerisms and sets forth proof to support the claim, courts
is a selfinsist that hostility towards an individual's sexual orientation ...
"nearly all courts ...
standing phenomenon, unrelated to and independent of the perpetuation of gender norms").
9

' See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218; see also Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763-64 (limiting Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping claims to gender non-conforming behavior that is readily demonstrable in the
workplace, such as appearance and behavior, and excluding claims based on off-work, gender non-

conforming behavior as not actionable); Burrows, 2015 WL 4250427 at *10 (adopting the Sixth
Circuit's "readily demonstrable at work" standard); E.E.O.C. v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No.
CIVA. 1:06CV2569TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *14-18 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008) (granting
employer's summary judgment in plaintiffs sexual harassment claim where harassing conduct "was
based primarily on [the plaintiffs] perceived sexual orientation, rather than his gender or gender

stereotypes"); Lynch v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 3:05-CV-0931-P, 2006 WL 2456493, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2006) (noting "when an admitted homosexual brings suit under a gender
stereotype theory, courts scrutinize such claim to ensure that it is not 'used to bootstrap protection

for sexual orientation into Title VII').
Iso Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218; see also Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1065 n.5 ("We recognize that
distinguishing between failure to adhere to sex stereotypes . . . and discrimination based on sexual
orientation . . . may be difficult [because] perception of homosexuality itself may result from an
impression of nonconformance with sexual stereotypes.")
'15 See Soucek, supra note 23, at 726; Friedman, supra note 23, at 226; Kramer, supra note 143, at
490; Capers, supra note 23, at 1160; SIGNORILE, supra note 144, at 48-51; see also Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67

FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1127 (2015) ("To this day some courts still fear that 'avowed homosexuals'
dishonestly attempt to squeeze sexual orientation protections out of Title VII . . . caus[ing] them to

parse through the judicial record to distinguish between discrimination based on homosexuality ...
and workplace mistreatment based on effeminacy.").
152

See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 290-91.
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may still reject a claim when the plaintiffs sexual orientation becomes an issue
in the case. In that instance, a court may find that the crux of the discrimination
was sexual orientation dressed up as a sex-based claim. 153 For instance, in
Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,' 54 the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs
"complaint and the discovery lay out a pattern of conduct by [his supervisor]
that is designed to ridicule the plaintiffs effeminate characteristics . . . .155
However, the court determined that plaintiff's stereotyping claim was not viable,
in part, because the facts also demonstrated that the supervisor attributed the
plaintiffs effeminacy to his perceived homosexuality. 156 Thus, the court
analyzed the claim as one of sexual orientation and not sex stereotyping.1 57
In contrast to the cabined, unpredictable approach to the issue described
above, an increasing number of courts and the EEOC have recognized that
sexual orientation discrimination may also constitute sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination
Despite the weight of authority to the contrary, several courts have held that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is actionable as sex
discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC reached the same conclusion in
Baldwin v. Foxx, ' a decision on which this section primarily focuses. The
Baldwin decision relies on and discusses the analyses of many of the courts that
have adopted this position.
a. Baldwin v. Foxx: The InextricableLink Between
Sex and Sexual Orientation
The EEOC's position on sexual orientation discrimination has changed over
time. Consistent with DeSantis and other similar cases of that era, the EEOC
once held the view that "sex" was an immutable trait with which one is bom.
Homosexuality, it determined was a "condition ... relate[d] to a person's sexual

See Cunningham-Parmeter, supranote 151, at 1129.

'"

154 Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 748 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

"s id. at 718.
6

1s

See id. at 719.

See id.; see also Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 F. App'x 48, 50 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
despite some evidence that the plaintiff had been the victim of gender stereotyping, the record as a
whole "demonstrates that the harassment was based on perceived sexual orientation, rather than
gender.").
'

`8 Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 012013380, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (July 16, 2015)
("Accordingly, we conclude that Complainant's allegations of discrimination on the basis of his
sexual orientation state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title
VII.").
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proclivities or practices, not to his or her gender." 159 It reversed course in
Baldwin. The EEOC considered many of the same arguments in Baldwin that
had been raised almost four decades earlier in DeSantis, but it reached different
conclusions as to each one of them.
David Baldwin worked as a temporary Front Line Manager in a federal
Department of Transportation ("Agency") facility in Miami. He alleged that
because of his sexual orientation, he was not selected for a permanent position
despite being qualified for it and despite management's knowledge of his
interest in it.1 60 Although Baldwin's formal Agency complaint alleged that he
was discriminated against on the basis of sex, the substance of his claim was that
16
the discrimination occurred because he was gay. 1 In addition to his sex/sexual
orientation claim, Baldwin also alleged that he was subject to retaliation for
62
complaining about his discriminatory treatment.1
Because Baldwin worked for the federal government, the federal sector
anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII applied to his claims. Those
provisions are worded a bit differently from-but in substance are analogous
to-the provisions governing private sector employees. 163 The Agency
investigated Baldwin's complaint and dismissed it. It notified Baldwin that the
portion of his claim involving sexual orientation was only appealable to the
Agency but not to the EEOC, because it did not involve an issue that arose under
Title VII. 164 Baldwin nevertheless appealed the Agency's decision to the EEOC,

"'See EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 1975 WL 4475, at *2 (Nov. 21, 1975); see also Capers, supra
note 23, at 1169 (articulating the EEOC's position).
60
161

See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2.
See id. This section describes the personal experiences creating the basis for Baldwin's claim. For

instance, he alleged that when he had once mentioned that he and his partner had attended Mardi

Gras in New Orleans, his supervisor told him "[w]e don't need to hear about that gay stuff." He also
alleged that on numerous occasions when he would speak about his partner, his supervisor would tell
him that he was being a distraction.
162 See id. at * 1.
163 See id. at *4.

'6 See Facts About Discriminationin Federal Government Employment Based on Marital Status,
PoliticalAffiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm. (last visited Dec. 14,

2016). This section notes that "[t]he EEOC enforces the prohibitions against employment
discrimination" through enforcing several statutes, including Title VII); Overview of Federal Sector
EEO ComplaintProcess, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/

fedemployees/complaintoverview.cfm. (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (providing an overview of the
process whereby employees may file a complaint and may appeal a negative final Agency decision

of a discrimination claim to the EEOC); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a)-(c) (2012) (detailing
required agency programs; through these federal regulations, federal sector employees-including

executive agency employees-may file claims of discrimination covered by statute); Baldwin, 2015
WL 4397641, at *2 (describing how in the FAD, the Agency informed Baldwin that he could appeal
the dismissal of his retaliation claim to the EEOC, as it was covered by Title VII. However, because
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which determined that it had jurisdiction to hear his appeal on the sexual
orientation claim as such a claim does in fact arise under Title VII.' 65
The EEOC acknowledged that Title VII does not mention sexual
orientation, but it determined that the relevant issue was whether the Agency
had "relied on [sex based] considerations" or taken gender into account when
taking the challenged employment action. 66 According to the EEOC, "sexual
orientation [discrimination] is inherently a 'sex based consideration,' and an
allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an
allegation of sex discrimination under Title VI.""' It continued:
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised
on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations,
stereotypes, or norms. "Sexual orientation" as a concept
cannot be defined or understood without reference to sex. A
man is referred to as "gay" if he is physically and/or
emotionally attracted to other men. A woman is referred to as
"lesbian" if she is physically and/or emotionally attracted to
other women. Someone is referred to as "heterosexual" or
"straight" if he or she is physically and/or emotionally
attracted to someone of the opposite-sex. ... It follows, then,
that sexual orientation is inseparable from and inescapably
linked to sex and, therefore, that allegations of sexual
orientation discrimination involve sex-based considerations.1 68
The EEOC explained that these sex-based considerations may manifest in a
number of ways when it comes to sexual orientation, and it set forth three nonexclusive ways to establish that sexual orientation discrimination is sex
discrimination. First, it occurs when an employer treats an employee less
favorably because of sex by-for instance, suspending a lesbian employee for
displaying a picture of her wife on her desk while a male employee is able to do
so without penalty. 169
the Agency determined that Title VII does not protect against sexual orientation discrimination, it
advised Baldwin that he had to appeal the dismissal of that claim to the Agency).
..See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2-4.
166

See id. at *4.

161

Id. at *5.

16s Id.

69 See id. at *5-6 (citing Hall v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-2160 RSM, 2014 WL 4719007, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 22, 2014)); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212
(D. Or. 2002); Hall, 2014 WL 4719007, at *2 (employing a similar analysis to find that the employer
discriminated against a male employee when it denied spousal benefits for his husband although
female employees married to men were allowed the benefits); Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1223
(detailing a case where the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor had directed a litany of anti-gay
comments to her and other employees, in which the court determined that a reasonable jury could
have found that the employer would have acted differently had the plaintiff been a man dating a
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Second, the EEOC explained that sexual orientation discrimination is sex
discrimination when it occurs because of an employee's association with a
member of a particular sex.I"e Such claims are not novel and have arisen in other
contexts under Title VII. Courts have had no problem holding that unlawful
discrimination includes discrimination against an individual because of the race
of an individual with whom the employee associates. In Parrv. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins., Co., for instance, a white male applicant stated a claim under
Title VII when his prospective employer refused to hire him because of his
interracial marriage. 171 A claim lies in these circumstances because but for the
employee's race, the employer would not have treated him adversely; his race
was a factor in the adverse employment decision."' The EEOC determined that
the same analysis should apply with regard to sex. If an employer discriminates
against an employee because her spouse is female, the employer has engaged in
associational discrimination if it treats similarly-situated male employees
differently.173
Finally, the EEOC recognized that sexual orientation discrimination is sex
discrimination because it relies on stereotypical notions of how men and women
should behave in their respective sexual roles. 174 Even courts that refuse to
recognize sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII acknowledge that the
line between sexual orientation and sex discrimination blurs, but, as explained,
some courts have attempted to separate the two. For instance, some courts have
required that a sex stereotyping claim be based only on outward workplace
conduct. The EEOC, however, saw no statutory support for restricting sex
stereotyping claims in this manner. It noted that "discrimination against people
who are lesbian, gay, or bisexual . . . often involves far more than assumptions

about overt masculine or feminine behavior." 17 Rather, "sexual orientation
discrimination and harassment '[are] often, if not always, motivated by a desire
to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.'"'176

woman, instead of a woman doing so). These cases demonstrate a straightforward case of sex
discrimination as members of one sex have been subjected "to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
170

Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6.

'i

Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 1986).

See id. at 892; see also Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that
"an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an employee because of the employee's
association with a person of another race").
172

17

See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6-7.

174 See id. at *7.

171 Id. (emphasis added).
171

Id. at *8 (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)).
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b. Baldwin v. Foxx: Plain Language and CongressionalIntent
The EEOC also responded to oft-cited reasons courts have offered to refuse
recognizing sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. These reasons
include that the Congress that enacted Title VII intended for the statute to cover
only traditional notions of sex and that Congress has repeatedly tried but failed
to enact a statute providing explicit protection for sexual orientation-an action
that arguably demonstrates that the trait is not already covered under Title
VII."' The EEOC disposed of both arguments in turn.

"

As to the first issue, the EEOC noted that when it recognized the viability of
same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the Court was guided by the
statute's plain meaning and not what Congress may have intended to do in
1964."1 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the Court resolved a circuit
split regarding whether same-sex sexual harassment was actionable under the
statute. "9 The plaintiff in that case, a male who worked as a roustabout with an
all-male crew, alleged that his coworkers subjected him to sexual abuse.
Relying on circuit precedent, the district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.is'
Prior to Oncale, courts addressed the issue of same-sex sexual harassment
in one of the three ways. Some, like the Fifth Circuit, which decided Oncale,
held that same-sex sexual harassment was "never cognizable under Title VII."l 82
Other courts allowed such claims only if the plaintiff could prove the harasser
was homosexual and thus the harassing conduct was motivated by sexual
desire. 8 3 Finally, other courts suggested that such claims were viable as long as
the harasser's conduct was sexual in nature.' 84 The Court did not explicitly adopt
any of these approaches. Instead, the Court held generally that same-sex sexual
harassment was cognizable under Title VII as long as the harassment occurred
"'because of . .. sex.""8 5
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia explained that Title VII's
proscription against sex discrimination protects women and men and "evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of

.n See id. at *8-9.
1n

See id. at *9.

17

See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).

Iso See id.

at 77.

181 See id.
182

See id. at 79.

183 See id.
184 id.

"s Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
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men and women."1 86 He acknowledged that "male-on-male sexual harassment in
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII."'5 However, he continued, "statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed." 88 Oncale established that sexual
orientation discrimination could also be actionable under Title VII regardless of
what Congress may have envisioned in the 1960s as long as such discrimination
is discrimination because of sex. Mary Anne Case has explained that Oncale
"demonstrated willingness on the part of conservative textualists like Justice
Scalia to apply the plain ... language of Title VII-rather than seek to restrict it
by reference to legislative history . .". 189
It is also worth noting that members of Congress today are fully aware that
Title VII has been and may be interpreted to protect LGBT employees. Until
recently, the sexual orientation measure that had failed repeatedly to pass in
Congress was referred to as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
("ENDA").1 90 Congress last considered ENDA in 2013, and at that time, six
Senators voiced concern about the measure in a committee report.191 One of the
several reasons for their opposition was that ENDA was unnecessary because
"[numerous] States and the District of Columbia have adopted" laws proscribing
1 92
employment discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgender employees.
They continued, "[i]t is also noted that employment protections for LGBT
individuals have been granted under Title VII . . . [and] courts do have the
such protections under certain circumstances."' 93 Accordingly,

power to extend

Id. at 78 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)); see also id. at
79 (explaining that "[i]f our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing

1"

in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely because the

plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the
same sex").
87

Id. at 79.

' Id. (emphasis added).
189 Legal Protections,supra note 23, at 1342.
190 Congress has since abandoned

ENDA and in 2015 introduced the Equality Act, a more

comprehensive bill to combat discrimination against LGBT individuals. See Zack Ford, The Equality
Act Could End Legal LGBT Discrimination for Good, THtNK PROGRESS (July 23, 2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/07/23/3683728/equality-act-introduction/ (describing how unlike
ENDA, the Equality Act would not be a stand-alone measure but would amend existing civil rights
laws to protect LGBT individuals from discrimination in a number of areas, including employment,
public accommodations, housing, and equal access to credit).
191

See S. REPT. No. 113-105, at 5, 24-25 (2013), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/

II 3th-congress/senate-report/105/1.
192 See id. at 26.

193 Id.
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even some of ENDA's opponents in Congress recognize that Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination has been used to protect gay and lesbian
employees in some instances, and even more importantly, that courts have
authority to interpret the statute in this manner.
As for the second reason courts have refused to recognize sexual orientation
claims (Congress' repeated attempts but failure to enact a new statute), the
EEOC explained that Congressional inaction in this regard lacks persuasive
significance. Numerous inferences may be drawn from that inaction, the EEOC
noted, including "that the existing legislation already incorporate[s] the offered
change." 194 As explained, some legislators had argued that ENDA was
unnecessary because LGBT individuals already enjoy some protection from
discrimination under Title VII, which strengthens the EEOC's position.' 95
Similarly, the EEOC also rejected the argument that recognizing sexual
orientation discrimination would create a new protected class, requiring a new
statute.196 The EEOC pointed out that this argument was inconsistent with prior
interpretations of Title VII that had addressed analogous situations. '" For
instance, when courts held that Title VII protects an individual of one race from
discrimination because she associates with someone of another race, a new
statute protecting "people in interracial relationships" was unnecessary. Rather,
courts simply applied "existing Title VII principles" to these new scenarios and
found the statute reached such claims.'19 The same result follows for the female
employee who experiences an employer's ire because her wife, partner, or other
associate is also female, although her similarly-situated male colleague is treated
differently. No new statute protecting people in "same-sex relationships" is
necessary. The discrimination is because of sex, which applying the statute as
written, is covered by Title VII. Because the EEOC determined that sexual
orientation discrimination was cognizable under Title VII, it remanded the case
to the Agency for consideration on the merits.
C Sex Discrimination:A ContinuingEvolutionaryProcess
Baldwin represents an evolving understanding of sex discrimination. Many
courts have not yet caught up. There is nothing new, however, about courts
adopting a cabined approach to understanding the many ways in which sex

'94 Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *9 (July 15, 2015)

(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
19 See Legal Protections,supra note 23, at 1342; Ford, supra note 190; S. REPT. No. 13-105, at 5,
24-26, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/ 113th-congress/senate-report/105/1; see also

supra text accompanying notes 189-92.
196 See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at *9.
i9' See id.

'

See id. (noting several similar examples in which the court found Title VII protection).
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discrimination may manifest. Catharine MacKinnon, for instance, has explained
that courts were slow to acknowledge that sexual harassment involving opposite
sex persons could constitute sex discrimination because, they opined, "the acts
99
complained of were not seen to be sufficiently tied to the workplace context."l
Some courts also blamed the harassing conduct on factors other than sex. For
200
instance, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, the plaintiff
alleged her supervisor had invited her to lunch where he made sexual advances
toward her, physically detained her against her will, and threatened her job if she
did not submit.201 The court refused to see how the victim's sex played a role in
the way she was treated. According to the court, Title VII's purpose was to
remove barriers to opportunities for women and not to provide a federal tort
remedy for a physical attack, motivated, not by the sex of the victim, but by
sexual desire for her.20 2 The court also stated that to recognize Tomkins' claim
would mean having to recognize sexual harassment in other contexts, including
when claims involved individuals of the same-sex, a proposition it called
"ludicrous." 203 As explained, courts were also slow to recognize the viability of
same-sex sexual harassment claims until the Court corrected course in Oncale.
Similar to the discussion here with regard to Title VII, the Court also has
recognized an evolving understanding of discrimination because of sex under
204
the Equal Protection Clause.
Like sexual harassment before it, sexual orientation discrimination is
merely another step in the evolving understanding of what it means to
discriminate because of sex. Courts that reject this argument effectively treat
sexual orientation as if it were any number of neutral factors on which
employers might discriminate. Title VII's substantive anti-discrimination

"9 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 59 (1979).
200

Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976). Tomkins was

ultimately reversed by the Third Circuit on these grounds, but this case provides a good example of
the type of analysis where the court considered contributing factors other than sex. See generally

Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
201 See Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 555.
See id. at 556; see also Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9,
1974) ("The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated against, not because she

202

was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor.").
203 See Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556 ("The gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even

not crossed at all."); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)
(holding that Title VII protects women and men from opposite as well as same-sex sexual

harassment).
204

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603-04, 2595 (2015) ("[I1n interpreting the Equal

Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal
unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and

unchallenged." The Court specifically discussed how the law has evolved to reflect better the
understanding that women are entitled to equal dignity under the U.S. Constitution.).
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provision only forbids employers from firing, refusing to hire, or otherwise
discriminating against individuals in the terms and conditions of employment on
the bases of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 205 In that regards,
discriminating against an employee on other bases typically raises no Title VII
issue.206 However, as Baldwin explains, sexual orientation is never neutral with
regard to sex because sexual orientation discrimination encompasses sex-based
classifications, assumptions, and stereotypes.
The position is supported by the APA and other leading mental health
and medical organizations. The APA explained in its amicus brief filed in
Obergefell that "[s]exual acts and romantic attractions are categorized as
homosexual or heterosexual according to the biological sex of the individuals
involved, relative to each other."207 Thus, there is an inextricable link between
one's sex and one's sexual orientation.20 s Sex may be taken into account without
consideration of sexual orientation, as when, for example, an employer refuses
to hire women. The same is not true for sexual orientation, which necessarily
takes into account the sex of the individual and individuals to whom he or she is
attracted or intimate.2 09 The concept of sexual orientation is meaningless without
considerations of sex.
Title VII imposes liability where sex (or another protected trait) is a
motivating factor in the adverse employment action. 2 1 0 The ultimate, relevant
inquiry under a Title VII disparate treatment theory is whether an employer
imposes on one sex "disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed." 2 1 Because sexual orientation,
as a concept, takes into account one's sex (relative to the sex of others to whom
one is attracted), discrimination because of an individual's sexual orientation in
some respect is related to and motivated by his or her sex. As Baldwin explains,

205

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).

206 The exception is where a neutral factor creates a disparate impact on a given group. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(k); Ricci v. DeSefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009) (describing how Title VII did not
expressly include provisions for disparate treatment until the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
See Brief of the Am. Psychological Ass'n at 10, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004713.
207

208 See id.; see also Koppelman, supra note 35, at 239 (explaining that "[e]veryone understands
'sexual preference' or 'sexual orientation' to refer to the gender of one's object-choice").
209

See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("Sex and sexual

orientation are necessarily interrelated, as an individual's choice of romantic or intimate partner

based on sex is a large part ofwhat defines an individual's sexual orientation.").
210

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).

See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
211
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Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination means that employers may not
212
"rel[y] upon sex-based considerations" when making employment decisions.
Treating a subset of men differently from women who engage in the same
type of intimate behavior or are perceived to do so is disparate treatment
because of sex either as a matter of formal equality or sex stereotyping. 213
Courts have been hesitant to recognize sex discrimination when it imposes
gender-based restrictions regarding with whom an individual is or may be
intimate. Suzanne Goldberg has addressed that hesitancy in the context of the
marriage litigation. She explains that while some courts struck down state
marriage bans because they discriminated on the basis of the sex of individuals
2 14
wanting to marry, litigators rarely led with this theory to challenge the bans.
215
Further, when the argument was raised it had little traction with most judges.
Goldberg opines that courts may have shunned this argument for fear of its
potential impact in other contexts, such as the right of employers to maintain
216
gender-based dress and grooming codes.
There is in this regard a path dependence issue. Recognizing sex
discrimination in one context may weaken the argument for sustaining it in
others.2 17 Indeed, courts may have been concerned that accepting the argument
in the context of marriage might have eventually led to the erasure of all "social
distinctions between men and women." 218 Goldberg explains that some judges
may have been concerned that "if sex based rules were not tolerated on
occasion, we would all wind up in unisex tunics .... 219
Goldberg's observations may well be true, but any upheaval may be
cabined to some extent by extant interpretations of the Constitution and Title
VII. The Court has sanctioned appearance regulations by government employers
220
Some sexthat enforce gendered distinctions despite constitutional challenge.

Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 012013380, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 16, 2015)
(citation omitted).
213 The same of course is true for women who are treated differently than their male counterparts
who are intimate with women.
214 See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 2130.
212

215 See id.
216

See id. at 2133 n.171.

217

See id.

218

Id. at 2133.

219

Id. at 2133-34.

See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (rejecting the claim that a hair length policy
violated a male police officer's due process rights, particularly because the employer was a police
force; this fact entitled the force's imposition of a dress code to a presumption of validity as a
uniform appearance among police officers is a desirable goal, promoting the "espirit de corps" and
making officers readily recognizable by the public).
220
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based distinctions also have been permitted under Title VII. 22 ' The issue is one
of degree. Some courts, for instance, have upheld sex-differentiated grooming
standards that are part of an overall appearance code and that do not impose
greater burdens on one sex or the other. 222
Putting aside gendered appearance codes for the moment, sex-based
distinctions that discriminate on the basis of association or intimate conduct with
members of a particular sex should violate Title VII. It is hard to imagine that
courts would hold otherwise with regard to some other protected traits. Racebased associational discrimination has long been unlawful. It also would surely
violate Title VII's proscription against religious discrimination if an employer
acted adversely toward a Catholic employee who, instead of dating another
Catholic, elects a Protestant instead. Likewise, an employer who discriminates
against its female employees because they choose to associate with other women
and not men should likewise violate Title VII. The type of relationship has not
mattered in other contexts, such as marriage, 223 dating, 224 or business dealings. 225
The nature of the relationship should not matter with regard to sex either. The
employer is taking sex into account in all these instances when making a
decision that harms the employee.
Finally, the fact that the employer applies the same discriminating criteria
(e.g., the prohibition of same-sex attraction or conduct) to male and female
employees alike does nothing to eliminate the taint of sex discrimination. 226 A
contrary argument has surface appeal but unravels upon inspection. Suppose, for
See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109-12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(rejecting a sex stereotyping claim that an alleged employer's grooming policy requiring women to
wear make-up violated Title VII and explaining that appearance policy that imposed different but
essentially equal burdens on men and women does not violate Title VII); see also Viscecchia v.
Alrose Allegria, LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that "every federal court of
appeals that has addressed the issue has similarly found that prescribing gender-differentiated hair
length standards does not create an actionable claim under Title VIl" and collecting cases); see also
Williamson, supra note 31, at 694-96 (explaining the "Equity Approach" adopted by some courts,
which allows employers to "impose different but essentially equal burdens on men and women").
222 See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109-12; Viscecchia, 117 F. Supp.
3d at 250-51.
221

See Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that where a discrimination claim is based on interracial marriage or association, it is a claim of
racial discrimination for purposes of Title VII); see also Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130,
138-140 (2d Cir. 2008).
224 Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 585, 589
(5th Cir. 1998), vacated
223

in part on othergrounds, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (holding that a discrimination claim
based on interracial dating is a valid claim under Title VII).
225 See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that a law "providing that women
may enter into business contracts only with other women" creates a valid claim under Title VII).
226

See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184-85, 288 (1964) (striking down as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause a statute that prevented unmarried interracial, but not same-race, couples
from habitually occupying the same room at nighttime as the statute did not survive strict scrutiny,
the standard of review applicable when classifications are race-based).

Same-Sex Sex and Immutable Traits

39

instance, that an employer refuses to grant a promotion to mothers (but not
fathers) with young daughters because of the belief that instead of spending the
additional time it would take to do the job, the employee should be home
teaching her daughter how to be ladylike. Similarly, suppose the same employer
imposes the same rule for men (but not women) who have young sons because
of the belief that they should spend their evenings teaching their tykes how to be
"real men." The employer's rules classify by gender, and the fact that an
ostensibly similar rule is imposed on both men and women does not save it from
Title VII challenge.227 The rule treats men and women differently based on their
sex in relation to the sex of their children and is also grounded in stereotypes.
The same holds true for the male employee who is harassed or otherwise
punished because of attraction to or intimacy with other men or the female
employee with regard to other women, when opposite sex pairings would be
treated differently. The sex discrimination is apparent on its face.
Below, the article seeks to expound upon the proposition that sexual
orientation discrimination is Title VII actionable. To that end, the next section
discusses a common framework courts use to address some Title VII claims and
through which sexual orientation claims might be filtered-sex plus theory. It
then argues that aided by Obergefell this framework might be used to
conceptualize sexual orientation discrimination as impermissible sex
discrimination under Title VII.
STRIKING (ALMOST) AT THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION

IV.

Title VII's broad proscription against sex (or other proscribed)
discrimination is not absolute.22 8 Both Congress and the courts have limited the
reach of the statute in certain instances. The section below explains.
A. PermissibleSex Discrimination
The statute permits employers to show that sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the employer's business

227

See Latta, 771 F.3d at 481 (Berzon, J., concurring) (explaining that "a law providing that women

may enter into business contracts only with other women would classify on the basis of gender. And
that would be so whether or not men were similarly restricted to entering into business relationships

only with other men"); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325-26, 332 n.16 (1977)
(explaining that a regulation requiring the sex of prison guards to match the sex of the inmate

population with which they worked explicitly discriminated on the basis of sex, but ultimately
holding the regulation was permissible under Title VII as a bona fide occupational qualification).

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.
. . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
228 42

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because

of such individual's .. . sex. . . .").
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("BFOQ"). 229 While interpreted narrowly, that defense allows an employer to
argue that the job requires that an employee be one sex or the other. 230 The
BFOQ defense, however, does not establish the end point for when employers
may treat the sexes differently under Title VII.
Despite the plurality's broad rhetoric in Price Waterhouse that Title VII
requires that sex must be irrelevant when making employment decisions, 3 ' the
statute in practice has not required trait blindness as some scholars have argued.
Mary Ann Case, for instance, has suggested that after Price Waterhouse,
employers must be indifferent to the gender expressions of men and women. 232
If an employer allows women to express gender by, for instance, wearing
lipstick and skirts, then it must permit men to do the same.2 33 Taken at face
value, Price Waterhouse could be read as extending beyond sex stereotypes and
forbidding employers from taking sex into account under any circumstance
absent a BFOQ.234
Such a reading would be troubling because it forbids employers from
considering protected traits for benign purposes. For example, a purely traitblind approach would undermine an employer's voluntary affirmative action
programs, which the Court has sanctioned under Title VII. 235 These programs
necessarily take protected traits into account in determining whether to award or

229

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) ("[lIt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . .. sex . . . in those certain instances

where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .").
230

See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333-34 (explaining that the "bfoq [bona fide occupational-qualification]

exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of

discrimination on the basis of sex").
231

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) ("We take these words to mean that

gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.").
232

See DisaggregatingGender, supra note 33, at 48 ("The language both of Title VII itself and of

the Court in interpreting it does, however, suggest that, at least where sex is not a BFOQ, Congress

has required an employer to treat the sexes as fungible.").
233 See id.; see also Trait Discrimination, supra note 29, at 177-79
(discussing this theory, which
Professor Yuracko also refers to as "trait equality").
234

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 230-40 (explaining that unless the BFOQ defense applies,

"gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions"). See also Soul ofa Woman, supra note 136, at

776 ("[T]rait neutrality simply restates a conventional understanding of the sex discrimination
prohibition that has been used in a range of contexts. It is a reading that extends beyond situations
involving sex stereotypes and does not rely on them.").

See United Steelworkers of Am., v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-627 (1987); Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci's Dicta: Signaling a New
Standardfor Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 241, 243-46 (2011)
(discussing Weber and Johnson). Cf Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-84 (2009) (sanctioning
another scenario in which discrimination would be permissible under Title VII; an employer may
violate Title VII's disparate treatment provision where it has a strong basis in evidence that a failure
235

to do so would subject the employer to liability under the statute's disparate impact provision).
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withhold particular employment opportunities. The Court, however, has upheld
these programs in narrow circumstances because they advance the statute's
salutary purpose to provide equal employment opportunities to persons Title VII
236
was designed to protect.
The Court's gloss on sexual harassment jurisprudence represents another
instance where discrimination may be permissible despite Title VII's broad
proscriptions. In Oncale v. Sundowner,237 the Court rejected arguments that
recognizing the viability of same-sex sexual harassment would turn Title VII
into a civility code.238 It reasoned that the risk of that happening is no greater
2 39
The Court also stated that
than it is for recognizing opposite-sex harassment.
Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite
24
sex." 240 Title VII, it declared, "requires neither asexuality nor androgyny." 1 it
"forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of
42
the victim's employment. 2 "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's
purview." 243 That harassing conduct must be "objectively" offensive means that
some conduct, even if accompanied by a discriminatory motive, is beyond Title
44
VII's reach.2

236 See United Steelworkers ofAm., 443 U.S. at 195 (explaining that a literal reading of the statute,

which bars such programs, conflicts with the statute's purposes, which included "open[ing]
employment opportunities for [African Americans] in occupations which have been traditionally

closed to them").
23

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).

238 See id. at 80.

239 See id.
240

Id. at 8 1.

241 See id.
242

Id.

243

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993)) (internal

quotations omitted).
2

.

4See, e.g., Stancombe v. New Process Steel, LP, No. 15-11791, 2016 WL 3090691, at *4 (11th
Cir. June 2, 2016) ("Not all workplace harassment, even if it [sic] based on sex, violates Title VII . .

. Harassment is actionable only if the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [the plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working environment.") (citation

omitted); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
every sexually hostile work environment will ground a Title VII claim";
(explaining that "not ...
complained-of conduct also must be "so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the

victim's employment.") (citation omitted); Morris v. Oldham Cty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 790 (6th
Cir. 2000) (holding that while some of the conduct plaintiff complained of occurred "because of
sex," the sexual harassment claim was not viable where "defendant's conduct was not severe enough

to create an objectively hostile environment"); Rigau v. Pfizer Caribbean Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d
272, 282 (D.P.R. 2007) ("Despite Title VIH's protection against discrimination based on sex ... the
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Oncale's statement that Title VII requires neither asexuality nor androgyny
also means that some sex-based distinctions may occur in the workplace without
sanction. 245 This point is obvious. While some workplaces have transitioned to
unisex bathrooms, all have not. Judicial precedent suggests that an employer is
likely able to maintain separate restrooms for men and women without engaging
in unlawful sex discrimination 246 (although Congress may legislate further on
this issue). 247 Allowing female employees, because they are women, to eat lunch
only after every male employee has done so would certainly be unlawful. 248
Every case is not so straightforward. For instance, courts have struggled with the
legality of an employer's right to draw sex-based distinctions in the context of
gendered dress and grooming codes. In some instances courts have relied on a
fundamental rights/immutability analysis to address this issue and others under
Title VII.
B. Sex Plus Theory
Title VII's sparse legislative history regarding sex as a protected class
shows that proponents of the amendment to protect that trait under the statute
were concerned about the lack of opportunities for women in the workplace.
Women, for instance, were excluded from entire categories of jobs.249 Title VII
prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the
workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment.") (citation omitted).
245 See Trait Discrimination, supra note 29, at 187 n.91 (suggesting that Oncale represents
that the
Court imposed some limits on the theory of trait equality or neutrality).
246

See Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Few would disagree that

an employer's blanket exclusion of women from certain positions constitutes 'discrimination' within
the meaning of Title VII. At the same time, few would argue that separate toilet facilities for men
and women constitute Title VII 'discrimination."'). C.f G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.

Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718-21 (4th Cir. 2016) cert granted sub nom, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G.
ex. rel. Grimm, No. 16-273, 2016 WL 4565643 (Oct. 28, 2016) (holding, in a Title IX case, that the
Department of Education's interpretation of a regulation that allowed for sex-segregated bathrooms
was reasonable regarding transgender students; sex should be determined with reference to an

individual's gender identity and not merely his or her biological or birth sex).
247

The Equality Act, which would amend Title VII and other federal statutes to protect LGBT

individuals and is currently pending before Congress, would permit individuals to use the restroom

and other shared facilities consistent with their gender identity. See H.R. 3185: Equality Act,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 14/hr3185 (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). But see
generally Catherine Jean Archibald, TransgenderStudent in Maine May Use Bathroom that Matches

Gender Identity-Are Co-ed Bathrooms Next?, 83 UMKC L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that sexsegregated bathrooms should be held to violate equal protection principles under the U.S.
Constitution).

Cf. Fisk, supra note 30, at 1134 n.47 (setting forth examples of discrimination that would likely
violate Title VII but do not involve fundamental rights or immutable traits).
248

249 See Trait Discrimination,supra note 29, at 169-70, n. 15 (referring to workplace discrimination
against women as "ontological" in that the discrimination goes to the very womanhood of the

individual, i.e., her status of being a woman). See also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d
1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (describing discrimination based on "sex alone" as when an

Same-Sex Sex and Immutable Traits

43

2 50
has gone far in protecting women from this type of discrimination. The ways
in which discrimination occurs, however, are often much more complex. For
instance, an employer may not exclude all women from the workplace or from a
class of jobs, but may do so with respect to a subgroup of women. The latter
category of discrimination does not affect all members of a class, but affects a
subgroup of them. This type of discrimination has been referred to as "sex plus"
discrimination by some courts. 251 It occurs when an employer "classifies
252
employees on the basis of sex plus another characteristic."

The Supreme Court addressed a sex plus claim in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp. 253 The employer in that case refused to hire the plaintiff
consistent with its policy of not hiring women with pre-school age children,
although it employed similarly situated male employees. 254 Both the district
court and court of appeals rejected her claim. In vacating and remanding the
case, the Court noted that Martin Marietta hired women and thus the record did
not show "bias against women as such." 255 However, it held the court of appeals
had erred in interpreting Title VII to permit an employer to impose one hiring
policy for women with small children and another for men.2 56 Although the
Court did not elaborate on the rationale for its holding, other courts have
explained that the decision rested on the principle that Title VII is intended to
place men and women on equal footing with respect to job opportunities.257 The
employer's rule in Martin Marietta undermined that goal by imposing a barrier
to opportunities for a subclass of women to which similarly-situated men were
not subjected.

258

employer "refuses to hire, promote or raise the wages of an individual solely because of sex, as, for
instance, if [the employer] had refused to hire any women for the job ... because of their sex").
250 Trait Discrimination, supra note 29, at 169-70 (describing this form of discrimination as
occurring rarely today).
251 Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009). The court in Chadwick noted that
the phrase "sex plus" may be misleading because use of the "plus" term does not mean more than
sex discrimination is being alleged. See id. at 43. Rather, it means that "not all members of a
disfavored class are discriminated against." Id. (citation omitted). As the main text explains,
however, the "plus" refers to the fact that a non-sex based criterion (e.g., hair length) is used to
discriminate against a subclass of men or women. See infra text accompanying notes 253-266.
252
253

254

See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43.
See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
See id. at 543.

255

Id.

216

See id. at 544.

257

See Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

258

See id.
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Several courts have addressed these claims under a "sex plus" paradigm, 259
which has been applied to such diverse issues as dress and grooming codes, 260
parental status, 261 child care responsibilities, 262 and marital status, 263 with
varying results depending on the nature of the "plus" factor. 264 Under a sex plus
theory, lines have been drawn between sex-based distinctions that are proscribed
by Title VII and those that are permitted. 265 Some courts have drawn the
proscribed line at fundamental rights and immutable traits. 266
The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., 267 an en banc decision. The employer in Willingham refused to
hire the plaintiff because of his long hair. 268 Macon Telegraph believed that the
local business community associated long-haired males with hippies and
imposed a dress and grooming code on both men and women. Both sexes had to
dress in accord with "standards customarily accepted in the business
community," which was interpreted to mean that only female employees could
have long hair. 269

The Fifth Circuit held that the hair-length policy did not violate Title VIl.
After examining the legislative history of Title VII and authority interpreting the
statute, the court determined that Congress's primary goal in enacting Title VII

See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that "sex plus" describes
a case where not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against, but a sub-class is
treated differently).
260 See Williamson, supra note 31, at 687; see also Viscecchia v.
Alrose Allegria LLC, 117 F. Supp.
259

3d 243, 250-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
See In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978).
262 See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43; Gingrass v. Milwaukee Cty.,
127 F. Supp. 3d 964, 973-75 (E.D.
Wis. 2015).
263 See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
261

See Chadwick, 561 F.3d. at 43 (describing how "plus" is not merely more than sex discrimination,
but a case where "not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against").
265 See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g. Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (analyzing
Congressional intent to determine where to draw a line "beyond which employer conduct is no
longer within reach of the statute").
266 See Trait Discrimination,supra note 29, at 205 (explaining that "commonly ... courts
interpreted
Martin Marietta narrowly, as prohibiting only sex-specific trait discrimination based on immutable
characteristics or fundamental rights").
267 See Willingham, 507 F.2d 1084
(en banc).
264

268 See id. at 1087 (explaining that that the employer's decision was based on disapproval of long-

haired males in the local community and further explaining that the incident stemmed from a pop
music festival that had recently taken place in nearby Byron, Georgia where long-haired youth and
scantily clad women attended the festival, in adopting its hair-length policy, Macon Telegraph had
taken note of the community's "indignation" over these events.).
269 See id. at 1087.
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was to provide equal access to the job market for men and women.270 It believed
that goal would be advanced if employers were forbidden from discriminating
against employees on the basis of immutable traits, such as race or a
fundamental right.2 71 It explained that Martin Marietta recognized that a policy
forbidding women but not men with pre-school age children to work violated the
statute because that attribute was preexisting and not easily changeable. 272
Moreover, the court recognized a distinction between, on the one hand, an
employer discriminating on the basis of a fundamental right-like having
children or marrying-and, on the other, factors that it believed pertain to an
employer's judgment on how to run its business. 273 It considered the hair-length
policy to fall in the latter category. The court opined that allowing employers to
make sex-based distinctions on that basis would not significantly affect
employment opportunities, because male employees who are denied
274
employment because of their hair length can easily cut it.
Scholars have heavily criticized the reasoning in Willingham and similar
cases. Catherine Fisk, for instance, has noted that the standard is vulnerable
because Title VII protects individuals from discrimination even when a plus
factor is neither an immutable trait nor fundamental right.275 This criticism is
fair. It is unlikely, for instance, that a court would allow an employer to subject
women but not men to mutable, arbitrary hiring criteria (e.g., women but not
men who drive to work must wash their cars on Sunday before noon).
Scholars also have been highly critical of using immutability as a means to
determine characteristics worthy of protection from discrimination. 276 The
criticism is particularly compelling if immutability is limited to so-called "hard"
270

See id. at 1091.

27 See id.

272 See id. (explaining that in Martin Marietta, the Court "condemned a hiring distinction based on

having pre-school age children, an existing condition not subject to change").
273 See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.

See id. at 1091-92 ("If the employee objects to the grooming code he has the right to reject it by
looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate his preference by
accepting the code along with the job . . . ." and "distinctions in employment practices between men
and women on the basis of something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not
inhibit employment opportunity"). See also Williamson, supra note 31, at 693 (explaining that
because individuals have control over hairstyle and "modes of dress [some courts held] that
discrimination on the basis of such characteristics does not stand in the way of equal employment
opportunity and therefore is not proscribed by Title VII.").
274

275 See Fisk, supra note 30, at 1133-34 n.47.
276 See e.g., Hoffiman, supra note 95, at 1541 (explaining that "advocates believe that the concept of

immutability is excessively rigid and that reliance on it will prevent liberalization of the employment
discrimination statutes"); see also COVERING, supra note 97, at 48 (explaining the "wrongness" of
[i]t
the immutability argument as it relates to homosexuality because it acts as "an apology(;] . .
resists the conversion demand by saying 'I cannot change,' rather than by saying 'I will not
change."').
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immutability, that is, traits that are "not chosen," unchangeable, and/or an
accident of birth, like race or national origin.277 However, immutability is
increasingly understood by courts and commentators as also encompassing
"soft" immutability, which includes characteristics that are difficult to change or
so fundamental to personal identity that one should not be forced to change
them.2 78 Religion, marital status, and sexual orientation have been described as
falling within the scope of this latter understanding of immutability.2 79
Despite this criticism, lines inevitably must be drawn in determining
employer actions that are permissible under Title V1l or proscribed by it. This is
so because Title VII represents a balance between the employee's right to a
workplace free from unlawful discrimination and the employer's right to manage
its workforce.2 80 The word unlawful is important because courts determine the
meaning of that term.281 The statute's legislative history reveals that Congress
intended for "management prerogatives . . . to be left undisturbed to the greatest
extent possible . . . except to the limited extent that correction is required

because of unlawful discrimination."2 8 2 Because an employer has an interest in
the way it presents itself to the public, it should be allowed some say in
employee appearance standards. 283 Courts generally have allowed employers
some leeway with these policies even when they contain sex-based distinctions

See Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges
and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REv. 871, 890-91 (2016) (discussing "hard" immutability); Hoffman,
supra note 95, at 1489. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
278 See Stein, supra note 277, at 890-91 (describing "soft" immutability
as "being very difficult to
277

change or . .. so important to a person's identity that it is deeply problematic" to force change and
noting that "far more courts have been persuaded by soft immutability arguments for LGBT rights as
compared to hard immutability arguments for LGBT rights"); Hoffman, supra note 95, at 1509
(defining an immutable characteristic as one "that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences
of its members that members either cannot or should be not be required to change it.").
See Hoffman, supra note 95, at 1530, 1533-36 (describing such characteristics as sexual
orientation and marital status as being fundamental to personal identity); see also Stein, supra note
277, at 890-91, n. 91 (arguing that religion is softly immutable, and further noting that what
Professor Stein calls "soft" immutability has also been referred to as "the new immutability").
280 See Hoffman, supra note 95, at 1521 (explaining that employers are
generally afforded autonomy
279

to run their business as they see fit, requiring that "[t]he law ...
balance the goal of combatting
pernicious discrimination against the goal of creating a hospitable environment for American
employers.").
281 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of DisparateImpact, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
125, 135 (2014) ("Discrimination is undefined in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and in key decisions the
Court has subtly charged itself with defining the contours of discrimination.").
Beam v. General Motors Corp., No. C-78-l130A, 1979 WL 41, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 1979)
(quoting 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N 2515).
282

See Williamson, supra note 31, at 705-06 (arguing that employer interests must be taken into
account in grooming code challenges under Title Vll).
283
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that conform to community standards, including gender norms.284 Thus, the crux
of the issue is not whether any policies distinguishing on the basis of gender are
permitted under Title VII. They are. The issue is the point at which they result in
unlawful discrimination.
An employer's invasion of a constitutionally protected fundamental right or
reliance on an immutable characteristic as a basis to discriminate on a trait
protected by Title VII could be used to determine whether discrimination is
unlawful under the statute. That standard does not have to mark the outer
boundary of the statute's protection. Rather, it would mean that the statute
reaches discrimination of this sort. The point here is not to make a normative
argument about where to draw the line (if one should be drawn at all) with
respect to permissible dress and grooming policies. It is to recognize that beyond
the BFOQ defense, Title VII permits discrimination in some instances, and some
courts have used a fundamental rights and immutability analysis to determine
which claims are covered by the statute. The purpose here is to demonstrate
how, post-Obergefell, these existing frameworks might be used to advance gay
rights in the workplace. As I argue below, wherever the line between protected
and proscribed discrimination should be drawn, at a minimum, the statute should
protect employees when constitutionally significant rights or certain highly
personal, intransigent characteristics that are fundamental to a person's identity
are involved.285 If this rationale is taken to its logical conclusion, Title VII
unequivocally should proscribe discrimination against men or women because
of sexual orientation after Obergefell.

See Soucek, supra note 23, at 770-71 (explaining that workplace appearance standards and dress
and grooming codes have often survived challenge under Title VII); Williamson, supra note 31, at
693, 698 (arguing that many courts continue to use an employer friendly approach to the issue of
grooming challenges, and noting that employees have not met with much success by challenging
gendered grooming codes under a Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory). See also Soul of a
Woman, supra note 136, at 786-87 (explaining that transsexual employees have been more
successful in challenging workplace dress and grooming codes than other employees because courts
are most likely to hold that such policies are burdensome and presumptively invalid if the plaintiff is
transsexual as the gender demand under those circumstances imposes high compliance costs. The
plaintiff will then win unless the employer can "name a business justification of some special
weight.").
284

Individuals may consider a characteristic that is wholly within their control to change or that
physically may be easily altered to be a fundamental aspect of their identity and thus softly
immutable. See e.g., D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can't Have Blonde Hair. . . in the
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 406-08 (2011) (describing the unique harm black
women endure because of employer policies that forbid them from wearing hairstyles reflective of
their culture and identity). Nothing said here suggests otherwise. So far, however, courts have been
resistant to these arguments. See id. at 411-21 (discussing cases that have rejected these claims).
285

The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice

48

V.

[20:2017]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION: THE TYPE OF DISCRIMINATION TITLE VII
SHOULD PROSCRIBE

An employer who treats female employees who engage in intimate behavior
with other women, or who are perceived to do so, differently than it treats
similarly-situated male employees sets up a classic sex plus scenario.
Discrimination is present even if the same employer treats male employees who
engage in intimate behavior with other men, or who are perceived to do so,
differently than it treats similarly situated women it employs. At its core, this
type of discrimination is no different than an employer refusing both to hire
women, but not men, raising young daughters, and men, but not women, with
young sons. This type of sex-based classification should violate Title VII. 2 86
Moreover, despite the connection between sexual orientation and sex, most
courts treat them as distinct concepts for purposes of Title VII.2 87 In that regard,
sexual orientation is treated similar to marriage, child rearing, and any number
of other neutral plus factors. As explained below, it also should be considered an
impermissible plus factor under Title VII.
First, the traditional rationale for recognizing immutable traits as plus
factors is that using them as discriminatory criteria significantly limits
employment opportunities because they are beyond the employee's control.288
Few would disagree that sexual orientation is fundamental to one's identity.289
Moreover, although the causes of sexual orientation remain a matter of
See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325-26, 332 n.16 (1977); see also supra text accompanying note 227.
286

287

See supra discussion Part III(B)(1) and accompanying notes.

288

See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (explaining that in Martin

Marietta, the Court "condemned a hiring distinction based on having pre-school age children, an

existing condition not subject to change"); cf Wiseley v.
1540(JBS), 2004 WL 1739724, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2004)
and dress is sufficiently within one's control such that it is
policies that specifically discriminate on the basis of

Harrah's Entm't, Inc., No. CIV.A. 03(noting that "one's personal appearance
easily alterable, while Title VII aims at
immutable characteristics that are a

fundamental aspect of that person" and rejecting argument that grooming code policy discriminated

on the basis of an immutable characteristic as the plaintiff admitted he cut his hair to retain his job).
But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that except for religion, Title VII
forbids discriminations only traits "beyond the victim's power to alter" or that burden one of the
statute's protected traits; if not strictly immutable, discrimination must involve a fundamental right
to fall within the statute's scope).

See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 7, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14574), 2015 WL 1004713 ("Sexual orientation ...
refers to an enduring disposition to experience
289

sexual, affectional, or romantic attractions to men, women, or both. It also encompasses an
individual's sense of personal and social identity based on those attractions, behaviors expressing

them, and membership in a community of others who share them") (emphasis added); Hoffman,
supra note 95, at 1530 ("Scientific research has not proven conclusively whether sexual orientation
is a biological trait that is an accident of birth, but it seems always to be fundamental to personal

identity.").
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debate, 2 90 a 2007 a task force established by the American Psychological
Association-the world's largest association of psychologists-found that
sexual orientation for most people is not a matter of volition, that there is no
evidence that shows that sexual orientation change efforts have proven to be
effective, and, in fact, that some evidence demonstrates that they may cause
harm. 291 In terms of modem understandings of sexual orientation, Obergefell
acknowledged the APA's position and none other. 292 Based on the task force's
findings, it is difficult to argue that requiring an employee to try to change her
sexual orientation for a job would not significantly limit her employment
opportunities; the effect on those opportunities would certainly be more than de
minimis. Forcing attempts at such change as a condition of employment is in no
way analogous to requiring an employee to get a haircut, don a uniform, or take
any action that is fully within the person's volition. Under those circumstances,
sexual orientation should be considered sufficiently intransigent to be an
impermissible plus factor under a sex plus theory.293

290 See Hoffman, supra note 95, at 1530.
291

In February 2007, the American Psychological Association (APA) created a task force, among

other things, to study, peer-reviewed journal literature on sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE).
The report noted that "change to an individual's sexual orientation [was] uncommon" for individuals

going through SOCE. The report also found that individuals have experienced harm from aversive
forms of SOCE, including "loss of sexual feeling, depression, suicidality, and anxiety." Many
individuals who participate in SOCE do so because of deeply held religious beliefs concerning
homosexuality. "Individuals who failed to change sexual orientation, while believing they should
have changed with such efforts, described their experiences as a significant cause of emotional and
spiritual distress and negative self-image." The report further found that the recent research on

individuals seeking SOCE did not distinguish between "sexual orientation" and "sexual orientation
identity" which obscured the issue of what can and cannot be changed. Studies show that while
"sexual orientation is unlikely to change, some individuals modified their sexual orientation
identity" as well other aspects of their sexuality, like sexual behavior. See APPROPRIATE
THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,
1,3 (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/1gbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf

Cf Brief for the American Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 8-9, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015
WL 1004713 (offering similar views on sexual orientation and SOCE. The brief noted "[m]ost gay
men and lesbians do not experience their sexual orientation as a voluntary choice" and "clinical
interventions that purport to change sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual . . . have not

been shown to be effective or safe.") See also Gregory M. Herek, et al., Demographic,
Psychological, and Social Characteristicsof Self Identified Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a

U.S. ProbabilitySample, 7 SEX RES. SOC. POL'Y 176, 188 (2010) (reporting results from a national
probability study that show that ninety-five percent of gay men and eighty-four percent of lesbians
"could be characterized as perceiving that they had little or no choice at all about their sexual
orientation").
292

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (discussing the trajectory of the rights of

gays and lesbians in the Twentieth Century until present time and noting that "[o]nly in more recent
years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of
human sexuality and immutable").
293 This article treats immutability and fundamental rights as separate inquiries with regard to sex

plus analysis although the case law is not always clear whether these inquiries are wholly unrelated.
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Second, discrimination because of sexual orientation also implicates a
fundamental right. Obergefell clarifies that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause confers a fundamental right upon adults to engage in consensual,
private, intimate same-sex sexual conduct. Both Lawrence and Obergefell
recognize that choosing the person with whom one shares one's life and bed are
among the most profound choices individuals make, regardless of the sexuality
or the sex of the individuals involved. 294 Where sexual orientation
discrimination occurs, the matter of same-sex intimacy is typically front and
center. Just as sexual orientation cannot be conceptualized without taking sex
into account,2 95 it also cannot be conceptualized without reference to sexual
conduct or the propensity to engage in such conduct with other individuals of a
particular sex. 296 According to the APA, sexual orientation is integrally
connected to the personal relationships individuals form or desire to form to
satisfy the basic human need for intimacy.2 97
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor recognized the
inextricable link between sexual orientation and the sexual conduct associated
with it. Texas argued that its anti-sodomy statute survived constitutional scrutiny
because it did not, punish homosexuals as a class, but only homosexual
conduct.2 98 Justice O'Connor rejected the distinction. Targeting the sex act in
which homosexual persons are inclined to engage targets them as a class. 2 99 As
Justice O'Connor observed, "[a]fter all, there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.""oo Likewise, history shows that targeting homosexual persons because

Cf Wiseley, 2004 WL 1739724, at *5 (explaining that "Title VII aims at policies that specifically
discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics that are a fundamental aspect of that person"
but rejecting the argument that grooming code policy was unlawful because it did not discriminate
on the basis of a trait over which plaintiff had no control, and also it was not a fundamental aspect of
his identity) (emphasis added).
294 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 ("Choices about marriage shape
an individual's destiny.");
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-72 (striking down Texas sodomy statute and holding that the
state law making same-sex sodomy a crime demeaned the existence of homosexual persons and
controlled their destiny).
295 See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al.,
as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 10, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
574), 2015 WL 1004713; see also Koppelman, supra note
accompanying notes 207-08.
296 See Brief for the American Psychological Association et
Petitioners at 10, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
574), 2015 WL 1004713.

(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 1435, at 239; see also supra text
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-

297 See id.
298

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

299 See id.

300 Id.
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of their sexual orientation status is indistinguishable from targeting the conduct
typically associated with that status.
As stated earlier, employers and others often used sodomy laws as a means
to fire or refuse to hire gay men and lesbians. 30 ' It did not matter whether an
30 2
individual had actually ever engaged in sodomy or ever intended to. Rather,
employers assumed that homosexual does as homosexual is. Status presupposed
conduct. Because of the homosexualization of sodomy, discrimination on the
basis of homosexual sexual orientation became a shorthand for punishing
homosexual conduct.3 03 As Andrew Koppelman has explained "[i]t should be
clear from ordinary experience that the stigmatization of the homosexual has
something to do with the homosexual's supposed deviance from traditional sex
roles."304
This connection between status and conduct is also seen in Title VII
harassment cases. Discrimination because of one's actual or perceived sexual
orientation often involves a suspicion or accusation that the victim is engaging
in same-sex intimate conduct. 305 Permitting an employer to discriminate on the
301

See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.

302 See

id.

303 See Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (recognizing the

connection between homosexual status and conduct by noting "[o]ur decisions have declined to
distinguish between status and conduct in this context.").
3

Koppelman, supra note 35, at 234. See also Mary Riege Laner & Roy H. Laner, Sexual

Preference or Personal Style?: Why Lesbians are Disliked, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 339, 350-51

(1980) (finding that, consistent with earlier studies regarding gay men, lesbians are disliked because
of their sexual orientation and also to the extent they deviate from heteronormative behavior as a
departure from conventional gender norms in personal style maximizes the likelihood of
disapproval).
303 See Dawson v. Entek, Int'l, 630 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (alleged harassers claimed that

plaintiff "liked to suck dick" and "take it up the ass"); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
759 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that discrimination for perceived homosexuality included "frequent
derogatory comments regarding [the plaintiffs] sexual preferences and activities"); Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 2003) (detailing how alleged
harassment included rumors about plaintiff being involved in a "romantic" relationship with another

man); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260 (3d Cir. 2001) (determining that
alleged harassment included such comments as "everybody knows you're a faggot," and "everybody
knows you take it up the ass"); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (alleged
harassing comments included "go fuck yourself, fag," "suck my dick," and "so you like it up the
ass?"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that
alleged harassment including coworkers making "obscene remarks about [the plaintiffs] imagined

sexual activities"); Guerrero v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 13 C 1567, 2015 WL 1043535, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 6, 2015) (detailing a series of derogatory comments such as, "since you fuck bitches, do you
pee standing up" and "do you think you're a dude because you're with girls"); E.E.O.C. v. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28,
2008) (describing conduct that included comments claiming the plaintiff "liked boys" and "like[d]
boy's penis [sic]"); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D.
Or. 2002) (harassment included supervisor's "obsess[ion] with the fact that [the plaintiff] was having
an intimate relationship with a woman").
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basis of sexual orientation therefore imposes a significant burden on the right of
individuals to engage in that constitutionally protected conduct.
Some may decry using the fundamental rights/immutability approach to
addressing sexual orientation discrimination under Title V1l because it may
legitimize its use in other contexts like the grooming code challenges. However,
to the extent courts continue to analyze Title VII claims using the fundamental
rights/immutability metric in other contexts, they should be called to task if they
fail to apply it when sexual orientation discrimination is at issue. There should
be no carve out for sexual orientation discrimination just as there is no carve out
when an employer uses marriage or parenthood as discriminating factors. Title
VII does not explicitly protect individuals on those bases, yet Title VII forbids
discrimination in both instances under a traditional sex plus theory. Likewise, an
employee's sexual orientation should never be subject to management
prerogatives.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Whatever Congress intended when it amended Title VII to protect against
sex discrimination, the statutory meaning of that term has evolved. While
Congress likely did not contemplate that Title VII would protect individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation in 1964, members of Congress recognize that
possibility today. Congress in all likelihood also did not foresee Title VII
protecting employees against same-sex sexual harassment, but the statute has
been held to do so. Sexual orientation discrimination is merely another step in
the evolving understanding of what constitutes discrimination because of sex.
Perhaps Obergefell could have done more to aid that process had it struck down
the marriage bans under a sex-based Equal Protection analysis. The Court chose
instead to rely principally on a Due Process fundamental rights analysis. Thus,
that is the clay that scholars and gay rights advocates were handed to mold
arguments in favor of expanding rights for sexual minorities under existing
statutes. The sex plus theory articulated here is a step in that direction.

